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REGULATIONS

FOR THE

GREAT MANŒUVRES

OF THE

PRUSSIAN ARMY,

29TH JUNE, 1861.

106888

Translated from the German

BY

MAJOR-GEN. SIR CHARLES STAVELEY, K.C.B.

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PREFACE.

AT a time when all armies feel the necessity for a change, consequent on the adoption of a new arm, it may be interesting to British Officers to have a translation of the "Instructions for the Manœuvres of the Prussian Army." They will be found to contain much useful matter in a very small compass.—*(Translator.)*

ROYAL COMMAND.

BABELSBERG CASTLE.

Dated 29th June, 1861.

THE following Regulations comprise the various orders, instructions, and traditions which have been the rule until now for the exercise of troops in large bodies. They are to be an authority in this important matter, and being in a condensed form will be the more accessible; they contain new matter insomuch only as the introduction of rifled arms has rendered it necessary to point out their influence on tactics.

They maintain the principles laid down in the order of 12th July, 1840.

I.—That the brigade is the largest tactical unit with which exercises that are mere drill and contained in the Regulations are to be executed.

II.—The manœuvres being always executed by the co-operation of the different arms of the Service, their common action must be so combined that the movements of the troops are in accordance with the nature of the ground.

I desire you to publish these orders, and to see that all commanding officers in my army are made thoroughly acquainted with their purport and contents.

(Signed) WILLIAM.

To the Minister of War and Marine.

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REGULATIONS

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PART I.—DIRECTION.

I.—*General considerations on the object, dispositions, and direction of the manœuvres.*

The object of all manœuvres is—to qualify the leaders of all ranks and those under them in a campaign to carry out the duties required of them; to teach the men to handle their weapons skilfully, and to execute the necessary movements with rapidity and order; and, finally, to ascertain the degree of efficiency attained by each corps.

There are two kinds of exercises:—

(1.) Those whose object is simple tactics, designed to teach troops the use of their weapons and to accustom them to go through field movements (drill) with rapidity and regularity.

(2.) Those in which the features of the ground are considered, and which are conducted in accordance with a preconceived idea (manœuvres).

There are two ways of conducting them:—

(*a.*) Against a skeleton enemy led by an officer appointed for the purpose, the troops (division or *corps d'armée*) being in one undivided command under a single chief.

(*b.*) Two divisions, one against the other, each under a separate commander, to whom a general idea is given (field manœuvre).

The exercises alluded to under head 1 are laid down in the instructions for the different arms. It is most essential that these regulations be followed, and that whoever commands should know how to select and apply the movements executed—but, above all, that he have confidence in himself.

It follows, from the nature of these exercises that the brigade is the largest tactical unit with which the object proposed can be carried out.

In order that the manœuvres may be useful and that the different arms of the Service may co-operate towards a common end, they should be executed on ground adapted to the movements of the troops, and where there are obstacles to be overcome.

The main object of the exercises under head 2 is to put the ability of officers and soldiers to the proof, to train them to take every advantage of the ground, and to decide with quickness and intelligence on the nature of their position.

It is desirable when pre-supposing the relative position of troops (general idea), to give the officer in chief command and the several leaders of the force an oppor-

tunity of showing and of improving their military *coup d'œil*, of giving proof of quickness of decision and knowledge of handling troops according to the features of the ground and the circumstances that may arise.

It will be perceived by those who understand the purport of these exercises that no movement is dictated, no time fixed; all must be left to the discretion of the commander. Beyond the general idea, he has received no instructions defining the issue of the affair; in fact, the situation at the end of the manœuvre should be the *bonâ fide* result of his own dispositions.

Nothing would be more opposed to the intention of these exercises than to prepare for them by rehearsals beforehand.

All manœuvres will be therefore useful and instructive which place troops under circumstances in which they would find themselves in war, and where they will be accustomed to overcome the difficulties they encounter. It may happen in the field that a division or corps while on the march is ignorant as to whether or not it will fall in with the enemy, and if it does, in what position it will find him.

The unexpected news of his presence or his appearance will oblige the corps to deploy rapidly to take up a tactical formation. The corps may have marched in several separate columns, it will then have more difficulty in making the dispositions which the sudden appearance of the enemy necessitates. It is important that the troops should be exercised in these movements and that the commander should occasionally on the march announce suddenly the presence of the enemy, or cause the troops which are intended to represent him to appear. They will then be required to deploy from column of route, overcoming all the difficulties of the ground.

In order that these exercises may be profitable the commander should rectify the faults that may have been committed, on the spot, and impart the necessary instruction; all the movements ought therefore to be executed with the greatest steadiness and without precipitation. Order should be maintained in every manœuvre. If the erect carriage and steadiness required on parade cannot always be maintained, order should at any rate invariably prevail; it would otherwise be impossible to make a proper use of the troops. The "Appell" * must be kept up, for it is thus only that any one part of the force, a section for instance, can, in a moment, be disposed of, *i. e.*, by a simple order. The exercises under head 2 (*b*), are manœuvres of two *corps d'armée* (manœuvres in the field). They are placed in opposition to one another, in imaginary positions as if in war (general idea). The commanders having formed their opinions as to their respective situations, proceed according to their own judgment.

Another great object of these manœuvres is to test the aptitude of commanders, and give them experience in comprehending at a glance such incidents as may arise in war, to estimate them, and to act to the best advantage.

The general idea should always define the situation of the two parties, clearly and exactly, and in no way dictate what must be entirely left to the free judgment of the two commanders. Any interference or restriction as to the disposition of the troops would be quite opposed to the object of these exercises. The general idea may determine the strategical position of the two parties for the space of

* The "Appel" answers to our roll-call parade. The men fall in on the companies' private parades without arms and in fatigue dress and forage caps. The roll is then called, the orders are given out, and if it is pay day the men receive their pay.—(*Translator.*)

several days; the nature of the ground and other considerations, however, may render it advisable to substitute another idea for the exercises that follow. The general idea communicated to the two commanders should only inform them as regards the situation of their corps, and give them such instructions as they might themselves procure with the means at their disposal in actual war. It may also be supposed that the sudden news of other events has changed the state of affairs, and made it necessary to form fresh and suitable dispositions. The respective commanders notify in a general way the position and movements of the troops, but only make known the object to be attained and means at their disposal, in so far as is necessary for a full understanding of the orders. These orders should be as short and concise as possible, and as is customary on actual service, those which can be conveyed verbally should not be the subject of a written communication. Each leader of a fraction of the whole performs the part assigned to him in the dispositions, according to his knowledge of the locality and of the movements of the enemy; in short, to the best of his understanding of the circumstances that may be favourable or otherwise to the fulfilment of his task. These exercises will have effected the object in view, if they give the leaders on both sides opportunities of proving their judgment, and capacity to turn to account the situations and incidents that occur in war.

Much would be left to be desired if, at times and within certain limits, the leaders of brigades, battalions, squadrons and batteries, had not opportunities of acting on their own judgment in the general plan of operations, but were condemned to work always mechanically. The general idea would not coincide with the object of the

exercise if the plan of manœuvre did not excite a spirit of co-operation in the lower ranks. When the task assigned to each side is carried out in accordance with the object of the manœuvre, the dispositions made will exert the ability and intelligence of the leaders of all grades. The necessary division of a force going into action into advance guard, main body and reserve, enables several commanders to exercise their own judgment and act to a certain degree independently.

This opportunity occurs more frequently and under varied circumstances when detachments become necessary to carry out the general plan. If the movements on both sides only begin when each is fully aware of the position of the other and when further results can only be attained by an engagement, an important means of making these exercises instructive will have been neglected. The exercise of an engagement itself, mere tactics, is here only a secondary object. To take advantage of ground and apply the rules of tactics is also secondary. The main object lies in the proper use of the available forces to effect a given purpose. It consists, therefore, of marches and movements made out of sight of the enemy; in short, of all the preliminary measures the value of which must, in the end, be determined by the relative position of the two forces at the moment of action (which can only occur in actual war). The general idea should leave the widest scope for this essential part of the manœuvres. It should determine, in a manner that ought to correspond with the end in view, the position of each corps when the exercise begins and the point from which each shall commence its operations.

Each side must be under the necessity of procuring the required information regarding the position of its

adversary (of which it should have been in ignorance) by the employment of the same means as would be available on actual service. The distance between the opposing forces must be great enough to allow room for the movement of those detachments whose business it is on service to reconnoitre the force, position, &c., of the enemy. The exercise will be the more interesting and instructive if the ground to be reconnoitred is of a varied nature and suitable for all arms. The duties of outposts, sentries, supports, &c., demand in this latter case not only greater attention, but also a closer examination of the locality, and will then be the more instructive. The general idea may oblige one of the two sides to await in a defensive position the movements or even the attack of the enemy, to force the latter to sacrifice part of his troops in overcoming the difficulties of ground, and, thus weakened, to engage the reserve of his adversary.

In such a case, it is most essential to make a proper choice of position and to take skilful advantage of the locality generally, especially in placing the reserve. The offensive force is here obliged to attack, and its task is to discover the weak point of the enemy's position, to dispose of its troops according to their number and description, and to form and place the reserve advantageously. This last should never be wanting.

The general idea may induce both sides to fight; in this case they will meet with the mutual intention of attacking one another. The proper proceeding will here be to take a rapid glance at the situation, including all that the circumstances of ground, strength, and position of the enemy, &c., demand. The manœuvring forces approach each other according to the dispositions ordered. All that now takes place will be the more useful and

instructive according as it gives a more or less faithful representation of what happens in actual war. It is above all things necessary to appreciate thoroughly the various features of ground, to bear in mind their influence in the course of an action between troops of equal courage, and to make an appropriate use of them. If the exercises are to prove instructive, no means should be employed in the attainment of any desired object which it would be impossible or disadvantageous to make use of in a like case in war. A column of attack in a manœuvre must not, for instance, insist on what could only be brought about by a superiority of fire. In order that the leaders of the several fractions and different arms of the service may have an opportunity of manifesting their *coup d'œil* decision and the degree of proficiency they have attained, the whole of the movement must be executed leisurely, and with pauses, so that each leader may have time to look about him, consider the situation and form his own opinion on it. Neglect in observing the dispositions of the enemy occasionally gives rise to undue haste and precipitation. This is not only irregular, but entirely opposed to the object of these exercises, inasmuch as these dispositions would in war delay or even prevent an advance. In war moral effect is not unfrequently taken into account, which in mere exercises in time of peace can in no way be considered. The frequent practice of flank-turning movements in such exercises tends to unsteadiness and disorder in a greater degree than it would in war. A turning movement, viz., a threat on the flank or line of retreat of the enemy, cannot be considered in itself an absolute advantage to the side executing it or a disadvantage to the other side, all depends upon the manner in which the two parties meet at the end of the movement. The commander whose

flank is turned may have his forces well together, or his reserve in hand, while those of his adversary are divided or dispersed over too great an extent of ground; the latter would be then placed at a serious disadvantage.

As in war a battle consists of several separate acts, divided by time and place, so it is in these exercises, and the manœuvres in two bodies will maintain their great utility if the following conditions are fulfilled, and the effect produced by the several arms considered.

1. That the ground chosen answers the purpose, and the handling of the troops is satisfactory.—(This is apart from the judiciousness of the general idea and the whole of the movements resulting from it, without reference to details.)
2. That the usual regularity enforced on the parade ground is never lost, or when necessarily disturbed by obstacles of ground or other circumstances, it is at once restored.
3. That the regular formation of the troops in divisions, brigades, &c., is not deviated from farther than is required by the unexpected peculiarities of ground and other influencing circumstances that occur in war.
4. That all the movements are executed (except in rare instances) at the usual marching pace.
5. That the different arms perform their duties, viz.—The infantry their attacks, the cavalry their charges, and the artillery the service of the guns as laid down in the Regulations.

By the neglect of these principles, on the other hand, the most awkward situations may result, and the primitive formation, indispensable to order, be lost.

The leaders of fractions, and of the several arms, will

have opportunities of acting independently during the steady and united progress of the whole manœuvre, and of taking intelligent advantage of any mistakes made by the enemy. By these means they will assist in attaining the end desired by their own side, and promote the accomplishment of the general idea. The interest in the exercises, which for want of stimulus would necessarily flag, will thereby be sustained and increased, even in the lower ranks.

II.—*Special Instructions for directing the Manœuvres.*

A. Manœuvres of a division and of a *corps d'armée* against an enemy represented by small detachments of troops (Skeleton enemy).

The object of these manœuvres is to exercise the senior officers, as if on actual service, in moving large bodies of troops with order and according to the features of the ground; they should consequently never degenerate into mere drill.

It will only be necessary in future to notify for the manœuvres of a division or of a *corps d'armée*, the general idea and rendezvous of the troops.

It rests with the commander to decide the moment when the manœuvre ends; he should not communicate to the troops either dispositions or instructions on this subject, but should carry them out by his own word of command, and by orders communicated verbally through the staff. The enemy will be represented with his various arms, but not by troops drawn up in full force in order of battle. The plan (M) at the end of this book, with its explanations, is an example.

B. Manœuvres in the field.

1. *Preparations for the manœuvre.*—The officer commanding in chief conceives, first, *the general idea.* This

indicates in a general manner the supposed hostile attitude of the forces operating against each other. It is consequently the same for both sides. Secondly, *the special ideas.*

Those define the particular circumstances for the guidance of each side, while they indicate the object to be attained.

Supposititious Troops.—It is absolutely necessary that supposititious troops—that is, battalions and squadrons—represented by flags, should not be taken into account within the field of battle. A manœuvre becomes certainly more interesting and useful according as the relative strength of the opposed parties varies; but, if to bring this about, simulated troops or flags are employed, they must not be made to rise, so to say, from the ground, but should appear from beyond the limits of the field of battle, and have their approach signalled to the adversary at least as early as he would learn by his patrols, &c., that of real troops.

Supposition of ground.—Suppositions as regards ground are no longer admitted. The ground must always be considered as it really is.

Promulgation of the special ideas.—Special ideas should only be given out for one day, because the new situation can only be defined by the commanding general according to the position occupied at the end of that day. Special ideas may be prepared for the series of manœuvres in a general manner, but they must only be definitely drawn up and announced on the day immediately before being carried out.

Dispositions of the Commanders.—The commanders of the opposed sides decide on their own line of action, based upon the general and special ideas given, and they submit their plans to the commander-in-chief, whose interference

is restricted to modifying these dispositions when they are opposed to his special idea. The commanders must always notify in their reports the rendezvous, the places where they await orders, the direction to be taken in case of retreat, and the order of battle.

2. *Influence of the commander-in-chief on the course of the manœuvres.*—The commander-in-chief allows perfect freedom in carrying out these dispositions. He interferes when he wishes to alter the situation of both parties, but then only by means of a new special idea, or he may do so when the situation has become so altered by the course of the action, or by the decision of the umpires *(see* paragraph 1 of the rules laid down for manœuvres), as to render it necessary to give a new direction to the manœuvre.

3. *Criticism on the spot.*—The general commanding in chief will pronounce his opinion on the performances at the end of each day; he will therefore be very particular in following as closely as possible the course of the manœuvres to enable him to form an estimate of the leaders, of the conduct, discipline, and general bearing of the troops, and of the instruction they have received. To help him he will, when required, have the advantage of the observations of the umpires. In case of any unusual complications it may be advisable to interrupt the course of the manœuvre for the moment in order to explain the result that would occur in actual warfare, and to restore order should it have been lost. When this is to be done the "general halt" will be sounded, which must be repeated by all the trumpeters and buglers: the firing will then cease, and the troops of all arms halt on their own ground; the infantry will pile arms, artillery and cavalry dismount; the skirmishers and flankers remaining out.

On the "call" ("ruf") being sounded, commanding

officers, including commanders of battalions, squadrons, batteries, and detachments will, with their adjutants,* repair to the commander-in-chief at the spot from whence the sound came.

The movements will only again proceed when the "general advance" has sounded.

4. *End of the day's manœuvre.*—If during the course of a day's manœuvre one of the commanders thinks he has fulfilled the task allotted to him, or has become convinced that he cannot accomplish it, he will report accordingly to the general commanding, stating at the same time what line he proposes to take up for his outposts, and where he means to bivouac. As soon as he has received sanction for this he should take the necessary steps to break off the engagement and establish his outposts. Behind these the troops may, if necessary, have a short rest. The general in chief command may, however, at any time, if he sees fit, bring the operations to a close for the day, and decide on the line of outposts for both parties. The transition from action to a camp with its outposts, &c., as on service, forms a very important part of the instruction, and must not be passed over by a conventional cessation of hostilities.†

5. *The close of the manœuvres* will be notified on the last day by the "general assembly" and "appel" sounding.

6. *Criticism at the end of the day.*—Commanding

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* An A.D.C. is also styled an adjutant in Prussia (*Translator*).

† As an exception to the general rule, should it be undesirable to bring the action gradually to an end, and encamp as would be done on service, the termination of the manœuvre will be announced by sounding the "general halt."

officers will assemble on the "general call" being sounded at the end of each day's manœuvre to hear the "critique" of the general in chief command. In order, however, that the troops may not be delayed in taking up the line selected for the outposts and in reaching their camping ground, the officers detailed for outpost duty will not be required to attend, and an officer of superior rank told off beforehand, will march the troops to camp, the senior captains taking command of their respective regiments and battalions. The commanding officers must afterwards in bivouac inform their officers of the remarks made by the chief in command.

7. *Influence of cantonments on the manœuvres.* When all the troops are to bivouac, as is the rule when one whole *corps d'armée* operates against another, the issue of the manœuvre will be entirely left to the plans of the respective leaders; but when the troops at the end of a field-day are, for their better accommodation, to go into cantonments (which must be provided with the co-operation of the civil authorities, and with due consideration for the proprietors of houses), the leaders must have their freedom of action somewhat limited—not, however, to such an extent that a pre-arranged result can be expected, or that at the conclusion marches be made to the cantonments or lines of outposts taken up, which in actual war would be inconsistent with the state of affairs; the manœuvres must be conducted in this, as in every other respect so far as is practicable, like those on a real campaign. Troops are not, as a rule, to march more than fifteen or twenty (English) miles a day, including the manœuvres.

In carrying out these arrangements, and in the establishment of magazines for provisioning men and horses,

the officers of the staff will have opportunities of showing their efficiency. Should the commander-in-chief be induced, by bad weather or other reasons, to move the troops into cantonments instead of into bivouac, those cantonments must be compact, and such as would be occupied in a real campaign, and be determined upon on the field itself at the end of the manœuvre. The chief in command will point out on a map the circle to be occupied, and the distance of the cantonments from the line of outposts. He will apportion to divisions and brigades, the sections they are to occupy, and determine the place of general assembly in case of alarm. The distribution of the troops into quarters, and the appointment of their several alarm-posts will be left to the subordinate officers. Arrangements having been made for conveying provisions, straw, firewood, &c., to the troops, the only question to be considered is that of quarters, and the several villages and farms will then be available for whole battalions and squadrons. Shelter for horses, for whom no stabling is available, will be found behind buildings.

The military police will be particularly strict and careful in the performance of their duties, for the prevention of fire or other injury to property.

The troops, whether in bivouac or quarters, will be protected by outposts in bivouac; they will consider themselves as on actual service, and confine themselves within proper limits.

8. *Directions for the Waggon-Train, Carts, &c.* It is important that the troops receive their camp requirements on the bivouac ground as soon as possible. Considering, however, that the latter cannot be known beforehand, the trains can only be drawn up at convenient places, according

to the probable issue of the operations, and outside the field of manœuvre.*

In cases when whole *corps d'armée* are operating against one another, it will be especially advisable to park the trains at different points, so that the whole may not pass along the same road.

The places where the trains are parked must be made known to the commander-in-chief beforehand, who, as soon as he perceives the probable issue of the day's proceedings, will give orders as to the direction they are at first to take, and the commanders of the opposing forces will, as soon as the bivouac ground has been approved of, take such measures as will ensure their speedy arrival.

III.—*Conventional rules necessary for Manœuvres in the Field.*

A. Decision on the engagements, and interference of the commander-in-chief during the progress of the manœuvres.

1. Considering that in these peace exercises neither the courage of the troops nor the effect of their arms are brought into play, as would be the case in war, it must be left, in a great measure, to the intelligence of the officers to judge what would have been the result of the attack or of the defence of a position. It will doubtless happen that the views of officers opposed to one another differ; in such cases, and to shorten the contest for the possession of villages, &c. (which in actual warfare would probably occupy several hours), it is necessary to come to a decision. To give this decision in each separate case, and at the

* If, from unforeseen circumstances, in the course of the manœuvre, the troops have to pass these trains, they are to be considered as natural obstacles, or other impediment, and not liable to capture.

same time to leave the leaders otherwise unrestrained, is the duty of the umpires. They will give their opinion according to the existing state of affairs only, and without reference to the turn their decision may give to subsequent operations, or its conformity to the general idea given by the commander-in-chief.

The umpires are to determine—

a. If a force is to retire.

b. If it is supposed to be captured.

c. If it is supposed to be cut off.

d. If it is temporarily, and for how long, to remain inactive.

In cases *b*, *c*, the troops are to return at once to their corps, and take no further part in the day's operations; in case *d*, they will retire behind their lines, and there wait the appointed time.

The commander-in-chief and the leaders of the opposing forces must at once be informed of such decisons, in order that they may take measures accordingly.

Except in cases where His Majesty is pleased to appoint special umpires, the commander-in-chief will himself undertake the duties. Considering, however, that in extended operations he cannot be expected to be always at hand, he may appoint to assist him one or more officers of rank, whose names are to be previously notified to the troops.

B. The effect and speciality of the different arms and the nature of the country must be appropriately considered.

2. Troops are not to engage in volley-firing at a less distance than 250 paces; skirmishers on a plain never nearer than 200 paces; and a charge or attack with the bayonet is to halt at 60 paces from the enemy; so far they

must always be led with the energy required by the regulations, or they will not be taken into account. Cavalry and artillery must not be halted while exposed to the effective fire of infantry; cavalry and infantry are not to deploy where they would be exposed to an effective fire of grape, nor are skirmishers or artillery to be sent unprotected across a plain commanded by the enemy's cavalry; and so on.

3. Guns limbered up, that are not yet or are no longer in action, if without or with too weak an escort, may be captured by skirmishers or by cavalry.

4. In the event of an advantageous position—a defile, for instance—being such that it might, by superior numbers, be forced in front, and allowing that measures of defence have been judiciously taken, it does not follow that in war the first attack would be successful. In the manœuvres therefore, the defenders must, previous to an attack with the bayonet, be shaken by a superior fire. This will often require to be repeated, in which case the attacking troops must be retired as far—for the purpose of reforming and, if necessary, of being relieved—as if the attack had been made in real earnest. An increased fire of artillery and infantry should prepare the way for a renewed attack, and the assault with the bayonet made with, if possible, a stronger force. Should the number of fresh troops at hand permit, it may be advisable to make repeated attacks at short intervals. It is difficult in these exercises in time of peace to represent a decidedly successful cavalry attack. A thoroughly-defeated cavalry would, in actual war, only reappear on the field of battle after some lapse of time, or perhaps indeed not at all.

Infantry and artillery, against whom cavalry has been successful, will generally be unable to take further part in

the action. It is the duty of the umpire to decide on the extent of a success, and that of the victor to follow it up with a right comprehension of the state of affairs. These moments sometimes afford opportunities for the display of prompt decisions and of brilliant feats of arms; the umpires are therefore to give their utmost attention on such occasions. The prevailing practice of two opposing bodies of cavalry clinging to one another in deployed lines, and charging repeatedly at short intervals, must not be permitted. The beaten cavalry is always to retire at a trot; and if the cavalry that has been declared victorious follows, it must be at a walk, and at 500 paces distance.

6. A battalion in square, and which cannot yet be considered as shaken, must not be attacked by a single squadron; an attack may be undertaken by three or four squadrons, but in such a case the charges must be made in quick succession, and if possible from different sides.

C. Instructions for the prevention of accidents, disorder, or damage to property.

7. To guard against injury from ammunition, a distance of 60 paces must absolutely be kept between the combatants, the leaders of whom, should they accidentally approach nearer, must immediately call a "halt," "order arms," or "return swords." The umpire will then determine which side is to retire, and the pursuit by the victorious party will only be made at the prescribed distance for engaging.

8. As no firing can be permitted in the immediate vicinity of buildings, barns, &c., the defence of villages can only be represented by lines of skirmishers along the distant garden fences, and by attacks with the bayonet from masses in reserve. The parties that would be placed inside houses, farms, churches, &c., are to be posted near

them only, and instructed by their officers how they would have to act in real war.

9. The breaking up of a bridge can be imaginary only, and the umpire will determine the time supposed to be required for its repair.

10. Cornfields, enclosed meadows, and plantations, are not to be crossed by troops, and railways only at the proper crossings, and with necessary caution. These features of ground are nevertheless only to be considered as obstacles to freedom of movement in a tactical sense, if they are so naturally, and irrespective of the protective measures of the police—viz., meadows when marshy, plantations when very dense, lines of rail when on embankments or in cuttings. A body of troops passing over a railway crossing on a level with the open plain, cannot be considered in the act of defiling, because in real warfare they could move with an extended front. In a manœuvre, therefore, neither the time occupied, nor the formation adopted to effect the crossing, is to be taken advantage of. The directing officer will be held responsible for all damage done by the troops, unless relieved from such responsibility by higher authority.

D. Dress of officers attending as spectators.

11. All officers attending the manœuvres as spectators will, to distinguish them, appear without sashes. The umpires will wear the sash and a white band round the left arm above the elbow.

PART II.—Execution.

IV.—*Effects of Prussian firearms—Difference between the Needle-gun and the Minié Rifle, and the tactical consequences.*

The effects of the Prussian field artillery and of the needle-gun at various distances, are shown in the annexed table,* they are given in order that the range may be taken into account in the course of the manœuvres; and it is here necessary to bear in mind, that only the Prussian infantry is armed with the needle-gun; all other armies have adopted the Minié or other rifle on a similar principle. It follows therefore that while in the manœuvres the Prussian infantry is opposed to needle-guns, it would on actual service have to encounter the Minié rifle.

The army knows both rifles by experience; only a few words are therefore necessary to point out where the chief difference exists, the tactical consequences which result, and their disadvantageous influence on the utility of the manœuvres.

In range and accuracy the two rifles are nearly equal; the superiority of the needle-gun lies only in the rapidity of its fire. It is capable of being discharged, without hurry, three times as fast as the other. Four to five shots can be fired from it in one minute, while the Minié can fire at the rate only of one-and-a-half shots in the same time. It can be loaded moreover by the soldier in a lying-down position, thereby enabling skirmishers and small parties in close order to cover themselves in the open

* Not given in this translation, the range being much the same as British rifled arms.—*(Translator.)*

—an advantage their opponents are deprived of, owing to their being obliged to stand up to load after each shot. These advantages of the needle-gun are so predominant, that although the Minié is expressly constructed for musketry engagement, those armed with it must avoid such an adversary, or seek safety in a combat with the bayonet; a bayonet attack, however, in the open field, is out of the question, for at 500 paces it would come under effective fire. The enemy armed with the Minié would therefore, before crossing bayonets with their adversary, receive sixteen rounds, each more deadly than the preceding one. The Minié rifle must accordingly avoid the open, and choose its battlefield, under all circumstances, in a close country. The columns of attack will then find shelter, while advancing, for a longer time, and when they do come under fire will have a shorter distance to traverse, and be exposed to a less number of rounds. It comes to this, in short—that owing to the rapidity of its action, 300 men armed with the needle-gun can deliver a fire equal to that of a battalion 900 strong armed with the Minié, and be liable, moreover, to fewer casualties on account of showing a smaller front.

The needle-gun enables one therefore to prolong an action, economise one's forces, ammunition, &c., and fight in deeper order than the enemy—*i. e.*, with more lines one behind the other; it enables one also to reckon on more troops in reserve, and without numerical superiority to act on the flank of the enemy while keeping him fully occupied in front.

The problem for the future tactics of the needle-gun will therefore be—

1. To tempt the enemy into an engagement, and keep him engaged.

2. To get him, if possible, into the open.

3. To fight in deep order, but so that the front can at any moment be extended for the attainment of great and speedy successes.

Considering that the manœuvres will be the more instructive the more faithfully they represent real war, it may be asked if the above three conditions, which, in a combat in earnest, must have very decisive results, would equally apply where both sides are armed with the needle-gun.

With regard to points 1 and 2, the answer must be in the negative, for it is impossible to execute them without putting the needle-gun into contradiction with itself. As regards point 3, both sides at the manœuvres being armed alike, the deep formation can certainly give no advantage or lead to any satisfactory result, but its formal practice cannot effect the needle-gun. As, therefore, the deep formation includes the formations of elementary tactics, which are drilled into the soldier and are second nature to him, it is recommended to be introduced at the manœuvres.

V.—*Manner of conducting the respective opposing forces before engaging the enemy.*

The strategical base must be preserved in a manœuvre, and never be forsaken except on compulsion.

It is not sufficient to meet and fight. The important point is to know where, when, and how to do so. It may be strategically necessary to postpone an engagement or to avoid one altogether, even when a favourable result is scarcely doubtful; for a victory costs time, and this, in war, is sometimes of more value than a victory. Such cases

as these will afford opportunities for real manœuvring, profitable lessons for the leaders, and be a faithful imitation of war; they must therefore be sought for by a correct appreciation of the mutual strategical position in the manœuvre.

This certainly has its difficulties; for one has to reckon on an unknown and always altering force—unknown, because the intentions of the enemy cannot be penetrated, but conjectured only; altering, because at every step that the hostile forces approach each other, the relative situation as to time and locality changes. But these difficulties, arising as they may in the course of events, serve also to heighten the use of the exercises.

At first, and when news of the enemy is wanting, the state of affairs can be least comprehended. The dispositions to be then made should be only those actually necessary at the moment. It would not do to scatter the seeds of misunderstanding and counter-orders from the very commencement. The rule at this period of the manœuvre is to have a well organized advance and rear-guard, correct information as to ground, a concentrating order of march, a formation admitting of rapid deployment, and the reserves of cavalry and artillery so ordered that they can be moved forward with facility. It is only when the collected information allows of a clear comprehension of the state of affairs that the moment has arrived for completing the dispositions. The commander will then be able to decide—

If he should avoid an action;

If he can still avoid one, and, if so, how;

If he must fight, and if so, where.

Should he be advancing, he will be best able to decide on his plans by accompanying the advance guard. He

will there see matters with his own eyes, and his orders will reach the troops the sooner. He will do well to remain with the advanced guard while the staff are carrying his orders, lest the aspect of affairs should alter.

Opening the Action.

In opening an action the following rules apply.

A.—General rule.

The order of battle prescribed in the Regulations is that from which the extension of the troops and their relative situation to one another must always be developed. When this order is departed from, and separations, detachments or a greater expansion, &c., are made, the object in view must be carefully considered, and the deviation regarded as an unavoidable evil never to be had recourse to without good reason.

So soon as the necessity for the deviation ceases, the primitive order must be at once reverted to.

B.—The defence.

1. Defensive positions must be chosen when possible in such manner—

a. That the defenders can be kept under cover until the very moment they are required.

b. That they have a clear view to their front.

c. That the front of the position is perpendicular to the line of retreat, or at all events not very oblique to it.

d. That, where the locality favours, accidents of ground should be taken advantage of to strengthen the front and flanks. If there should happen to be no natural support for a flank, it will always be better secured by reserves in rear than by an extension

beyond due limits. On a plain the flank should be secured by rifled guns.

2. In the case of positions behind defiles the dispositions should be such that the defile is conducive to the defence. This may be effected by one of the four following methods:—

a. By the direct defence of the pass itself.

b. By attacking with superior numbers the separate columns of the enemy, should he have divided his forces.

c. In the case of the enemy having traversed the defile in one column, by attacking him before he has had time to gain sufficient ground to deploy.

d. Finally, when the defender makes an attack on the enemy so near to the defile that the latter has only the one line of retreat close behind him, by obliging him to take up a line of battle oblique to the line of retreat; this result the defender can almost always insist on because he has himself no defile at his back.

The defender must endeavour to secure one of these advantages; how far he may have done so must be judged by the result.

C. The attack.

1. The turning of both flanks of the enemy at the same time can only be justified by great superiority of numbers, and is even then very seldom advisable.

2. The turning of even one flank, by means of a detachment, always argues a decided superiority.

3. On the other hand it is practicable to throw one's whole force on one of the wings of a superior enemy, and with more effect than by a simple attack in front. To this end it must be supposed that the assailant.

a. Has nothing behind him to cover.

b. That he can open a new line of operations and of retreat.

c. That the locality permits of maintaining one or more points in front of the enemy in order to insure his own line of retreat.

d. That the ground occupied by the enemy allows of an attack in which the assailant has the shortest lines of communication.

4. The enemy's centre may be pierced when one is certain of being able to bring more troops than he can to bear on a decisive point, and when the conditions of ground at this point are such that, all things considered, the superiority which the assailant requires is, for the time, on his side.

5. When the ground permits, the cavalry can with its necessary complement of horse artillery, make turning movements and send off detachments. The conditions in such a case, are—

a. That the assailant does not require for his own defence the cavalry he would detach.

b. That the locality favors the detached cavalry, so that it may be able to fall back on the main body under any circumstances, though it may be, by a detour.

c. That the point of attack assigned to the detached cavalry be such, that a certain effect may be relied on, be it by means of its artillery fire or by the sword.

6. Turning movements intended to induce an adversary to retire without fighting can only be effective when it does not suit his convenience to fight a general action. If he is able and willing to fight, he will seize every oppor-

tunity of attacking an enemy whose forces are disconnected, the usual consequence of turning movements. A turning movement of this nature is only appropriate therefore; when one knows that the enemy must retreat, and when one desires to hasten or render his doing so difficult. Considering that the assailant and the defender start each from a base, and have a line of communication to cover, each should, in the possible contingency of a retreat, notify the points on which it should be directed, and the attack must be so combined that this retreat is rendered possible.

Phases of the Battle.

A.—Economical employment of the troops.

1. The modern art of war shews in greatest force on the field of battle. Its aim there is to engage the enemy as much as possible, but with the fewest possible number of troops, and to exhaust his strength and his reserves by protracted engagements, while preserving one's own intact. Should this succeed, to strike at the most sensitive point, throw the enemy into disorder, and pursue his routed troops to the utmost. In this manner results have been obtained at a single stroke which former wars of many years duration could not boast of. The gist of these tactics lies in a wise economy of force, and in calculating on a contrary course on the part of the adversary.

This calculation cannot avail those who do not remain concentrated in front of the enemy, who make too many detachments, deploy too soon, extend too strong a line of skirmishers in order to dispute every foot of ground, and thus expend the reserves—in short, those who, as frequently happens in manœuvres, scatter their forces before the proper time without method; and when the crisis of the

battle comes upon them have scarcely anything at their disposal but swarms of unmanageable skirmishers.

3. The needle-gun is better adapted to these modern tactics than any other weapon, for the superiority of its fire enables one to be sparing of troops, allows of a deep formation, and of economising the reserves; moreover the efficacy of its fire gives greater effect to the last effort.

The tactical formation to render this economy of force effective is, company columns in the hands of battalion commanders, with a not too numerous line of skirmishers, whose fire is rendered more efficacious by the little volleys of the supports.*

B.—Influence of rifled arms.

This depends on nature of the ground:—

1. A hilly, close country is unfavourable to the employment of rifled artillery, and reduces the range of rifled arms to that of smooth bores. The relative conditions of a battle will here, therefore, remain the same as formerly.

The Minié rifle has on such ground no advantage over the smooth-bore.

The needle-gun maintains the superiority of three to one in file firing. The amount of its effect, however, is diminished by the shorter range.

On such ground, turning movements, while occupying the enemy in front with a reduced force, as already mentioned under head IV., promise the best results on account of the turning detachment remaining a longer time concealed from view of the enemy.

2. The open plain is the real field for rifled arms.

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* The Prussian supports move up to the line of skirmishers and fire volleys in close order.—(*Translator.*)

They there attain the full development of their superiority, and range far beyond what has up to the present time been considered the limits of tactics. It is now essentially necessary to prescribe these new limits rather than to purchase experience at too high a price.

The defence is an easy task. The endeavour should be as far as possible to place the troops under cover in hollows, behind undulations to be found even in the most open plain. The cavalry and reserves should take up such positions as will enable them to deploy easily on the flanks.

The wings should lean on batteries of rifled guns, having a free range to the front and flanks of about 3,000 paces. If the range is less, it will be to the advantage of the enemy. Such a disposition was formerly considered weak, if not faulty; now, owing to the effect of rifled arms, it is considered the strongest,—indeed, it so far surpasses the so-called *positions* that it has no weak side, and consequently cannot well be turned.

It enables one to perceive within a quarter of a mile (German) all the dispositions of the enemy for the attack, and not only to see, but to bring a destructive fire to bear upon him. The space to be gone over by the assailant under fire, is double now what it used to be. Where in former days it required a quarter of an hour's march to reach the enemy, it now takes half an hour. Two-thirds of the distance the assailant is entirely defenceless under the fire of rifled artillery, and one-third of the way he is under volleys from rifled musketry. It will be fortunate for him if these latter do not happen to be needle-guns. Artillery would certainly gain ground faster were it not tied to the movements of the infantry. It would be a fault to support it with cavalry. The cavalry of the

defensive side, whose field is also the plain, is in the meanwhile on the look-out. It has here every facility to deploy and fall on the enemy's disordered troops. It reserves itself for this the decisive moment which may be expected almost with certainty.

Should the attack be conducted according to the tactics which have hitherto prevailed, viz. deployment on an extended front, advance, fire by successive lines, and finally an attack with the bayonet, a glance at the table given at page ,* will show that the loss must be very great. Such an attack can have no good result, and when it fails, how, it may be asked, is the retreat to be effected.

Equally fruitless would turning movements be in the face of an enemy. The latter would detect them at once, and as before mentioned, easily frustrate them. There is, therefore, nothing for it, but either to manœuvre the adversary away from the open, to a close and favourable country for the defence, or to make an attack at dusk, or at night.

3. What has been said under head 1 and 2 of this section, regarding a close or covered country, and the open plain, applies also to a country combining the two, such as is frequently met with under the present system of cultivation.

The defensive side retains the advantage, if the commander has the sense to post his troops in such manner that his adversary is compelled to traverse the greatest possible amount of flat and open ground to reach him. In any case, however, the assailant will have a better field as well for the attack in front, as for pressure on the enemy's flanks.

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* Table of range omitted, being much the same as in the British Service.—*(Translator.)*

He must, especially, by taking skilful advantage of ground, endeavour to reach under cover, a position for opening the attack. His smooth-bore batteries and his infantry can thence move into action without risking the serious consequences before alluded to.

If the infantry is armed with the needle-gun it will engage in skirmishing order, lie down on the open, and keep up a continued fire.

Small volleys are employed with advantage against the borders of woods at a distance of 500 to 600 paces, then successively at shorter distances, until the subdivisions, closing on each other, advance to the attack.

Villages surrounded by gardens, hedges, pailings, houses built of clay, are to be acted upon in the same manner by volleys from small parties.

These small volleys, especially if converging from various points may have, even at a distance of 700 paces, a trifling and indirect effect against an enemy massed under cover of hedges, hillocks, walls, earthworks, redoubts, &c.

C.—Reports.

It is not sufficient for a commander to send his orders to his subordinates; he must be sure of their punctual delivery, and of their being understood. He must also be kept *au fait* as to the progress of their execution. This can only be effected by means of consecutive reports, each noted with the exact moment of despatch and numbered accordingly. A neglect of this control may bring discredit on the best arranged plans, and has indeed already compromised whole campaigns. This applies especially to the commanders of isolated detachments, advanced guards, rear guards, &c., and it is the duty of all officers, holding independent commands, even on the field of battle, to

keep the commander-in-chief continually informed of all that occurs of importance within the range of their commands, and more especially so when compelled by force of circumstances to deviate from the orders and instructions received. Many of these reports must be made verbally, and many also both verbally and in writing, according to their importance. They will be best conveyed by aides-de-camp and orderly officers, mounted on fast horses.

VI.—*Command of the advanced guard.*

The business of the advance guard is to clear the way for the main body following it, to screen and protect its march, to reconnoitre that of the enemy, and if necessary, to keep him in check until such time as the commander-in-chief has taken his measures.

Strength and Composition.

The advanced guard may be obliged to fight either on the offensive or defensive. It requires therefore a degree of tactical independence and a corresponding mixture of all arms. The latter must be proportioned to the situation relative to the enemy and to the nature of the ground. The strength is generally from one-sixth to one-fourth that of the whole force.

Distance from the Main Body.

The distance of the advanced guard from the main body varies. At too short a distance the main body is in danger; at too great a one it runs a risk itself. The danger diminishes or increases according to the ground and the strength of the enemy. The proper medium must be left to the discretion of the leader. To fulfil his

task satisfactorily he must direct his energies chiefly to four points:

1. To measures of security on the march;
2. To the obtaining of early and certain intelligence of the enemy;
3. To the acquirement of a knowledge of the ground, and to a profitable employment of the same;
4. To making proper dispositions on coming into contact with the enemy.

Measures of security on the March.

These measures consist in a chain of patrols with their supports, which cover and accompany the front and flank of the advanced guard. The front must be so extended as to cover the breadth of the main body following in rear, and the flanks so deep that they secure the space between the advance guard and main body.

The description of troops which should perform this service varies according to the nature of the ground. In a covered country the numbers of patrols are increased and placed farther off. These patrols form moveable pickets, so to say,—they reconnoitre the ground during the march, without, however, losing time, distance or connection; and they report anything suspicious. If danger is imminent, they open fire.

Obtaining early intelligence of the enemy.

These defensive patrols do not, however, at all suffice for the important service of procuring news of the enemy.

They answer as measures of security against ambuscades and surprises, but to penetrate the enemy's designs requires other means of a more active and intelligent

nature. The object is to be able at a glance to divine the intentions of the enemy from his strength, mixture of arms, direction of march, &c., to measure rightly the distances, to calculate the time required to march over them, the consequent dangers that may result, and to make a fitting report upon the same. This is beyond the capacity of non-commissioned officers and privates—indeed, it would be dangerous to suppose that it is not so.

This service can and ought to be performed only by able well-mounted cavalry officers, assisted by intelligent orderlies and protected by cavalry according to circumstances. They are the eyes of the commanding general, and the success of entire operations depends upon the information acquired by them. Too much pains and practice cannot, therefore, be bestowed on this branch of the service and on its proper organisation. The requisite number of officers proceed to the van of the advanced guard to be at the disposal of the officer of the general staff who accompanies it, and whose particular duty it is to explore the country and reconnoitre the enemy. This latter officer allots them their respective tasks, according to the locality. Their reports are sent back to this staff-officer, who collects and compares them, that he may be on his guard against false news. In the latter case the truth will be ascertained by these officers. He will report anything of importance back to the commander of the advanced guard, who will communicate it to those concerned according as may be necessary.

Reconnoitring the Ground.

Not less important is an accurate reconnaissance of the ground as regards road communications and their uses in an action.

The staff officer with the advanced guard, is also responsible for the practicability of the roads, and a party of pioneers must be attached always to the van of the advanced guard under an officer who directs the necessary repairs. The distribution of this party is so arranged, that at least one-half follows while the other half works. When necessary, infantry may be employed with them.

The reconnaissance of the ground is the duty of the commander of the advanced guard himself, assisted by his staff. They must bear continually in mind that the enemy may attack and drive back the advance guard.

They must notice all points that may be either dangerous or serviceable to the retreat, such as bridges, defiles, water, woods, &c., and reconnoitre accurately all positions in which they can make a stand for a time, or those where the main body can engage the enemy.

They must of all things consider and continually bear in mind how under such circumstances to dispose of the troops, the points on which to lean the flanks, the practicability of roads, &c., so that they may be ready at any moment, in case of necessity, to make dispositions and give a helping hand to the commanding general.

Dispositions of the Commander of the advanced guard on falling in with the enemy.

In case of the advanced guard falling in with the enemy the commander must (should he not have already succeeded by the means indicated under head 3) especially ascertain what he has before him; whether it is the advanced guard or the flanking party of a strong or of a weak force; whether engaged in an offensive march or in a defensive position; on which roads, at what distance, &c., in order that he may take his measures accordingly.

There is not much time to spare for all this: what has to be done must be done quickly, and should have been anticipated. The readiest means of procuring early intelligence is to make prisoners, and this may be done by cutting off the enemy's detachments on first falling in with them.

Should this not succeed, stronger detachments, ably commanded, must be pushed forward, and cavalry officers, as recommended under head 2, are best fitted for this service. The advanced guard advances meanwhile in the most advantageous order, viz. in echellon, and proceeds to reconnoitre the enemy without seriously committing itself.

If the commander is convinced that he cannot continue his march, he should make his dispositions according to the observations he may here make of the ground (as mentioned under head 3) and await the further orders of the general commanding in chief.

If the latter desires to give battle either on the ground taken up by the advanced guard or in a position he has himself selected farther back, (see head 3), it is important that the advanced guard prepare the battle-field for him, *i.e.*, occupy its important points before the enemy can do so, especially those in front (for instance, farms, woods, &c.) and hold on to them until the arrival of the main body.

The needle-gun in position under cover can here do great things, if *there is enough ammunition.* It is of course indispensable for mutual security that the conveyance of orders and information between the main body and the advanced guard, should be safe and rapid.

VII.—*The rear guard.*

The business of the rear guard is to cover and secure

the retreat of the main body. It requires therefore a relative strength, a degree of independence, and a proportion of all arms, modified according to the nature of the ground.

The measures of precaution during its march are the same generally as for the advanced guard, but in inverse order (see heads 1 and 2). The same rules apply as regards distance from the main body. The commander must not be thrown back on it, or allow himself to be cut off.

The closer he is pressed after an unfavourable engagement the more difficult is his task; such an occasion requires a correct knowledge of the ground and an able commander in action.

He must have the judgment to hold on at the right time, and also at the right time not only to retire, but to disappear.

If he commits the too common fault of endeavouring to defend every foot of ground, he will lose time, be held engaged in front, and turned on the flanks. If on the contrary he knows how to withdraw himself betimes from view of the enemy only to be sought after afresh and then found again in strong positions, he will be able to make head for hours against the enemy, gain time for his side, and be master of his troops.

Staff officers, with the necessary orderlies, proceed in advance to reconnoitre such positions, and to point them out without loss of time to the troops that follow.

When defiles have to be passed—bridges, for instance, —the reserves will establish a *tête du pont* in the strongest possible position, at the end next the enemy, and sufficiently spacious to enable the troops that follow to be drawn off safely under its protection.

The troops that have passed over, then occupy the

opposite bank to enable the reserves in their turn to retire. The pioneers make preparations for the destruction of the bridge, which they carry into effect so soon as the last man is over. Dams and causeways leading over swampy ground, require a similar procedure.

If the route leads through woods, which although practicable for infantry, are difficult for cavalry or artillery, the latter must be passed through as best it can while the infantry holds the borders; when this is effected the infantry disappears under cover of the wood.

Places where cavalry and artillery have the same difficulty in passing round, must be dealt with in the same manner. It may be necessary for the retreat of the rear-guard, under certain circumstances, to set fire to such places when leaving them.

The commanding general must be kept continually informed as to how the rear-guard is getting on, so that he may, in case of necessity, go to its assistance.

VIII.—*The Commander of Cavalry.*

Order, power and rapidity, are the attributes of a good cavalry; prompt judgment of the situation, quick decision, and rapid, daring execution, are the qualities necessary for the leader.

The leader must inspire the spirit of the enterprise—he must, so to say, burn for it. He ought to have freedom to act, and if he has not, he should be ready to take it upon himself. If he reports first, asks for orders what to do—in short, if he waits to learn from others what he should see to and decide on himself, he will invariably miss the favourable moment.

Infantry in line or in shaken columns, artillery limbering or unlimbering, cavalry deploying or exposing its

flank, are the opportunities for his attack, and his certain prize if he can take them unawares; it is however but the affair of a moment. To perceive these opportunities, the commander must neither remain actually beside his cavalry, nor ride about too much. He should stand quietly at suitable spots, because the more he gallops about, the less he will be able to see and observe what is going on.

His dispositions for the attack are made by means of aides-de-camp who convey his orders. He remains quiet himself that he may not lose an opportunity. He must give his continued attention to the movements of the enemy's cavalry, as well as to the progress of the whole manœuvre, in order that he may be able, not only to perceive the weak points and difficulties of the enemy when they first become apparent, but that he may even anticipate them.

In such a manner only will he find leisure to discern opportunities and favourable ground to precipitate himself on the enemy unawares, with suitable force and front; he will, in short, be in a position to decide how best to act. This will be a better course than to seek after petty successes, to the loss of great opportunities; better than to waste time against mere companies, when a battle might possibly be won.

He must appoint officers especially to ascertain the practicability of the ground, and to keep him informed of the strength and whereabouts of the enemy's troops.

His particular duty is to ascertain all that happens on the battle-field, and under certain circumstances to employ force for this object.

Any attempt at a turning movement on the part of the enemy should on no account escape him. His arm of the service is the most appropriate to check or avert a threat-

ening danger of this kind, and he should make use of it when necessary, on his own responsibility.

Cavalry attacks always in line, but manœuvres in columns. To deploy too soon is a very great mistake, because extended lines cannot be kept under cover, are open to surprise, and are a mark for the enemy's artillery. They cause loss of time in their unwieldy attempts to move, lurch to and fro, get into disorder, and end in missing the right direction. The column is the only formation that is adapted to march directly and rapidly on the point* whence the attack must be made. It can take advantage of undulations of ground to keep out of sight of the enemy and to avoid his fire. It can easily evade difficulties of ground and attain a desired position before the enemy suspects it. It then deploys rapidly, having a clear course of from 800 to 1,000 paces before it. The second line in column projects from the first line at such an angle that in case of the latter being beaten it may fall obliquely on the flank of the pursuing enemy.

If there is time, the horse artillery prepares the way for the attack, but the favourable moment must never be lost for the sake of a cannonade.

It is a glorious tradition, and one that every dragoon officer should bear in mind, that cavalry never awaits the attack at the halt, even when inferior in numbers, but advances against it.

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* This point is on the flank of the enemy's cavalry. It is difficult to choose the proper direction at the right moment, and this is an exercise that requires continual practice. A manœuvre is not however necessary for this, the drill ground being in every way suitable.

IX.—*Outpost duties.*

Sect. 1.

Employment of the several arms on outpost duties.

Outposts form a portion of the advanced and rear guards, and are composed of one or more arms according to circumstances and ground.

Cavalry is well suited to scour an open country, and is particularly well adapted to watch this kind of ground by day.

Infantry is more suitable for night duty and for ground that is impracticable or dangerous for cavalry.

In foggy weather and on clear nights the service may be performed by a combination of the two arms, according to the nature of the ground.

The business of the cavalry is to watch in the distance and reconnoitre; that of the infantry to ensure security in less advanced and in enclosed positions.

Artillery is employed on outpost service on special occasions, when it is important to hold certain points such as defiles, passes, &c., and to cover and protect water communications.

Sect. 2.

Object of outposts.

The object of outposts is—

1. To secure the troops encamped in rear from being surprised by the enemy.
2. To be informed of the position and proceedings of the enemy.

The first of these duties is performed by means of positions in advance, connected with one another, and by the occupation and defence of certain localities accessible to the enemy. The latter is effected by reconnaissances, *i.e.*, patrols varying in strength according to circumstances.

Sect. 3.

Composition of outposts.

Outposts are divided into several parts:—

1. Piquets, with their supports, detached posts, chain of sentries or videttes and patrols.
2. Reserve to the piquets.
3. Main body of the outposts.

These are all under the commander of the outposts, and receive orders from him only.

Sect. 4.

The commander of the outposts.

The commander of the outposts has the entire command of the troops detailed for outpost duty. In case, however, of the ground to be covered being very extensive, more than one commander may be appointed, according to circumstances; each to the charge of a section of the general line; they will act independently, but with regard to the general object in view. The commander makes his arrangements according to the instructions he has received. In the absence of orders, he decides on the line the outposts are to take up by day and by night, and determines the number of piquets,* supports and

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* It is injudicious to assign too great an extent of ground to each piquet, as it renders the duty laborious and lessens the security. It is also unadvisable to have the piquets too weak; thirty to forty men will generally be the proper strength, and distributed nearly as follows:—

3 to 4 double sentries . .	18 men	to 24 men.
1 single sentry over the arms	3 „	„ 3 „
For patrolling . . .	8 „	„ 10 „
Noncommissioned officers .	2 „	„ 3 „
Bugler or trumpeter . .	1 „	„ 1 „
Total . .	32	41

A smaller number of men will suffice for the patrols of cavalry piquets.

reserves to be employed. He makes known his dispositions to the commanders of the several links of the chain, who move off with the necessary precautions to the positions assigned to them, preserving their connection in doing so. A curtain of patrols or small reconnaissances must screen these proceedings* as much as possible from the view of the enemy. If a battle has been fought and outposts are thrown out immediately afterwards, they should be established under the protection of those troops who happen to be nearest the enemy. Troops in such a position stand watching the movements of the enemy, ready for action, and mask the posting of the chain of sentries until accomplished. They are not to be withdrawn until this is done, and their commander will place himself in communication with the officer in charge of the outposts to this effect.

As soon as the several links of the chain have taken up their positions the commander of the outposts will examine them carefully and give the officers of the several piquets, &c., more detailed instructions for their guidance. He will change, increase or diminish the strength of the different posts, should he think it necessary, and carefully point out to the commanders the positions they are to take up at night. He must see personally that his orders for night duty are strictly carried out. He should keep himself in constant communication with the several posts by means of reports and orderlies, and learn through them what the enemy is doing. In the absence of news of the enemy or in case the information he has received is inaccurate, he will send

* Those had better be taken from the reserve, as it will be easier for them to find their way back to it.

out strong patrols or reconnoitring parties, especially towards daybreak, to procure more precise information. The troops encamped in rear should be warned of these reconnaissances that they may not be alarmed unnecessarily. The commander of the outposts will send any news of importance which he may receive of the enemy to the rear, and remain during the night with the main body of the outposts.

Sect. 5.

Piquet duty. The officer of the piquet.

a. Posting the sentries (videttes).

The officer of the picquet moves with necessary precaution to the ground apportioned to him, and posts his sentries (videttes) under the protection of patrols.

This should be done with a military *coup d'œil*, and without losing time about trifling matters. Alterations can be made later, and after a more careful reconnaissance.

He will observe the following principles in posting sentries (videttes).

1. That his connection with the neighbouring piquets is maintained.
2. That the sentries have as clear a view as possible towards the enemy.
3. That they be concealed as much as possible from the enemy. On the other hand, it is desirable that they be visible from the supports. This can be arranged by means of connecting sentries (signal men).
4. That roads and byways are carefully watched, especially by night.

5. That in carrying out these arrangements the fewest possible number of men are employed, and that advantage is taken of the ground to shorten the line, by embracing impracticable places within it.
6. That sentries in sufficient number are posted to prevent any one approaching from the enemy's side unobserved, or without being stopped.

b. The post of examination.

The line of sentries is only to be passed where it is crossed by a road. A double sentry of the chain is posted here, and behind is the

Examining party

of four privates, who relieve the sentry and are under an intelligent non-commissioned officer. This latter examines and questions all who wish to pass the line of sentries either going or coming; and he passes or turns them back according to the orders he may have received from the officer of the piquet for carrying out the instructions of the commander of the outposts.

c. The detached post under a non-commissioned officer.

Peculiar circumstances, such as features of ground, &c., may oblige the officer of the piquet to occupy a point in front of the line of sentries. This is effected by a non-commissioned officer's party, posted either as a small piquet or as a so-called standing patrol. This means that the commander, while maintaining his position, makes himself safe by means of moveable or patrolling sentries.

d. The non-commissioned officer's post.

To ensure the distant sentries from attacks and annoyances by the enemy's patrols, and to give them confidence, a small non-commissioned officer's post, formed of

their reliefs, should be established at a convenient spot in rear, and strengthened if necessary by two or three patrollers.*

e. The supports to the piquets.

When the sentries are posted the officer decides on a position for his supports, which for infantry should be about 400, for cavalry 1,200 paces in rear of the centre of the advanced posts, and as much as possible under cover, and capable of defence. He places one man over the arms, divides his party into reliefs and patrols, and gives general instructions somewhat to the following effect:—

1. No compliments and no shouting; but on the slightest alarm quickly to arms (in the saddle).
2. No noise, but on the contrary, perfect silence.
3. No one is to absent himself without permission.
4. As to whether a fire may be lighted, and if so, when.
5. Whether smoking is allowed.
6. The men to rest in turn during the day by reliefs, and the horses to be watered and fed in the same manner.
7. All to be alert at night.
8. The knapsack must not be taken off at night (horses never unsaddled). The saddles may, however, be shifted.

The officer then allows the arms to be piled (cavalry to dismount), points out to the chain of sentries and the neighbouring piquets the position of their supports, withdraws the patrols sent out for security, and reports in

* In the event of rules *c* and *d* requiring a strengthening of the piquet; the officer must notify the same to the commander of the outposts.

writing to the commander of the outposts the position he has taken up, illustrated, if possible, with a pencil sketch.

Duty of the officer while on piquet.

The officer reports himself to any superior officer who may appear at the outposts. His first duty is to procure news of the enemy, and this he should do by means of patrols. He will immediately report anything of importance to the commander of outposts, if possible in writing, and giving the time to a minute. He will also, in case of approaching danger, at once warn the neighbouring piquets and reserves concerned. He is responsible for all who pass the chain of sentries either going or coming, and the duties of the examining party are under his personal surveillance, according to the instructions he has received from the commander of the outposts.

At night he always remains with his support.* He must not by day rest satisfied with merely going over the ground occupied by his piquet. He must consider it his bounden duty, by personal observation, to make himself acquainted with the ground and its practicability in all directions, so as to be able to instruct the sentries and patrols according to locality, and make his dispositions for anything that may occur, especially at night. It is advisable for instance at night, to change the position of the support, to move it to a road, and so to place it that surprise is impossible (it must not, therefore, be located in a house or farm yard). Look-out men must be posted in places whence, from the nature of the ground, danger is to

* Piquets without mounted orderlies, well acquainted with the ground, afford but a half measure of security. Vigilance alone is insufficient, a gain of time as well is equally necessary.

be apprehended. These proceedings must be agreed upon and arranged by day; it would be impossible to do so in the dark, and only lead to disorder.

The officer of the picquet should bear in mind that a well-ordered system of patrols contributes more to his security than the chain of sentries, and he must be careful that the patrollers, who ought as far as possible to be the same men for the same ground, do not during the day fail to make themselves well acquainted with the locality.

A patrol must be held always ready for urgent requirements close to the support. Immediately a shot is heard from the chain of sentries, it must hasten up to ascertain and report what is going on.

In case of an attack by the enemy, the officer must act promptly and with decision.

The general rule is to gain time for the troops encamped in rear; this is effected by the greatest possible resistance, supported by the reserve and the main body of the outposts. The officer of the piquet will do well at night to keep his forces together, fire to give the alarm, and use the bayonet for defence. A musketry fire in the dark is without effect.

Duty of the Sentries.

The chain is formed of double sentries, (videttes), numbered from right to left, in the same manner as the piquets. They do not take off their knapsacks. They pay no compliments, nor do they allow their vigilance to be in any way disturbed by the presence of superiors. To these latter they make no reports, but merely reply to questions put to them.

Inasmuch as it is necessary that the chain of outposts be concealed as much as possible from the view of the enemy, so also must no avoidable movement or noise be

allowed. No one may remain there, except the immediate commanders and those belonging to their escort. No one, without exception, is to be allowed to pass the line of sentries, either going or coming, except at the roads that cross it. Anyone attempting to do so, whether by day or by night, is to be at once "halted," and warned off to the nearest road. The double sentry posted there also calls a halt and orders up the examining party who act as previously laid down.

Whoever does not halt at the command, or otherwise disobeys the orders of the sentry, must be fired upon.

Reliefs and visiting patrols in going along the line of sentries, will move inside the line, that they may not be perceived from outside. They will be recognised by the sentries during the day, and need not be challenged; at night one man will approach the sentry, and announce his presence by a noiseless signal. The sentry will halt him in a low tone of voice, and demand the parole and countersign in the usual form.

The relief and correct giving over of orders will then be carried out under the non-commissioned officer. The remainder of the relief awaiting in silence behind the chain, the men who are being relieved.

In case of anything being observed by the sentries as regards the enemy, it is to be reported by one of them to the piquet. If danger is imminent, the sentry fires.

The sentry over the Arms (piquet sentry).

The sentry over the arms pays no compliments, nor does he turn out the piquet. His orders comprise duties partly of police and partly of security, and vary according to the time of day, locality, and other circumstances; they can therefore only be given to him on the spot by the commander of the piquet.

Patrols.

1. *Reconnoitring Patrols.*

Reconnoitring patrols of two or three men, are sent outside the chain of sentries towards the enemy, to procure information, and to reconnoitre the ground in front.

They afford greater security to the piquet, supposing always that their march, as regards time and place, is well ordered, and that the men told off for this important service have been very carefully selected.

The indispensable qualifications are — the talent of finding one's way quickly on strange ground, perseverance and an aptitude for this particular service, and that presence of mind and shrewdness which enables one to decide what to do in the moment of danger.

The patrols receive their instructions from the commander of the piquet each time they go out, and report to him immediately on their return.

They must proceed slowly, cautiously, without noise, and halt frequently to listen. They should reconnoitre the ground as much as possible, so as to be able to report upon it, and if necessary, act as guides. They will avoid all engagements, and be on their guard against being cut off or taken prisoners.

The hour of their return should in general be named. They must only exceptionally and by special order venture more than a quarter of a mile (German) beyond the chain of sentries.

2. *Visiting Patrols.*

Visiting patrols of two men move from time to time along the line of sentries up to the neighbouring piquet to ascertain what is going on and to ensure that all are in

their places. The best time to send them is between reliefs, because the sentries have then been reported on.

3. *Strong Patrols.*

The object of strong patrols is to ward off the enemy's reconnoitring patrols or to dislodge his posts, and ascertain in a measure what is behind. They may therefore, if stratagem fails, act on the offensive. They will proceed, nevertheless, with the same precautions as the reconnoitring patrols, so as to surprise, if possible, and not be themselves surprised or become the prey to an ambuscade. In case the piquet is not strong enough to furnish men for such undertakings, they must be taken from the reserve. They receive their special instructions from the officer of the piquet concerned, he being best acquainted with what is going on and report to him on their return.

Relief of the Piquet.

The relief moves off just before daybreak, in silence and with caution. It marches up on to the flank of the old piquet, and the commanders of the two carry out together the relief of the chain of sentries. The position is then taken up for day duty, and the commander of the new piquet acquires all the information necessary to him. Patrols of the old piquet, joined to those of the new one, advance meanwhile in the direction of the enemy, in order that these new patrols may be early introduced to the ground in front, and also that they may act as a protection to the sentries while they are effecting the relief.

It is advisable to notify to the piquet beforehand the hour of their relief, the name of the relieving officer, and to specify the troops who are to replace them.

Sect. 6.

Reserve to the Piquets.

The reserves are intended to support and re-inforce the piquets. They must accordingly not be too distant, and should be placed, where possible, at cross roads and under cover. It depends on the features of the ground and other circumstances whether the reserves mount at night only or by day as well.

The commanders place one sentry over the arms and secure themselves by means of look-out sentries at suitable places, according to time and locality. They maintain constant communication with the main body of the outposts and with the piquets in front by means of patrols. They concert measures of support with the officers of the piquets concerned, that they may be prepared in the event of their being attacked. What has already been laid down regarding the duty of the officer commanding the piquet, the instructions to his supports, the procuring and reporting of information and the early reconnaissance of the ground, applies also to the officer of the reserve.

Sect. 7.

The main body of the Outposts

Is under the special orders of the commander of the outposts, and should be so placed that it can be deployed in any direction according to the different arms of which it is composed. The measures for its security are a quarter and rear guard, who give the necessary look-out sentries.

The infantry pile arms, lay their knapsacks beside their arms, and keep on their accoutrements.

The cavalry do not unsaddle, nor the artillery unharness.

All cooking, feeding and watering, must be done by day.

In the event of a piquet giving the alarm the reserve stand to their arms (cavalry to their horses) and should a serious attack be made they must oppose the enemy or fall on his flank.

It is a valuable principle for the several component parts of outposts, that the smaller body must sacrifice itself for the larger one.

X.—*Bivouacs.*

The troops bivouac when it is necessary to have them together and in hand; for instance, in the vicinity of the enemy, when an action is desired, or when an engagement is likely to take place at any moment.

The bivouac should never be on the ground on which it has been decided to give battle, but in rear and near enough to be able to occupy it quickly and before the enemy can do so.

The communications between the bivouac and this position should be practicable and sufficient, or they must be made so. They are also necessary in rear of the bivouac as a precaution in the event of a retreat.

The troops should bivouac as far as practicable in order of battle, so that they may the more easily get into their places if surprised or if obliged to break up their camp during the night.

It is necessary besides, in making choice of ground for the bivouac, to bear in mind the health and convenience of the troops. The matters for consideration on this point are protection from the wind, freedom from damp, good water, that the watering places are suitable and convenient, and that the roads and villages are not too distant.

INFANTRY BIVOUAC.



Order of encamping.

A.—*Infantry. Entry into bivouac.*

Infantry bivouac always in double column on the centre.

So soon as battalions approach the ground on which they are to bivouac they march at attention, and form columns on the positions they are to occupy.

When this is done commanders of battalions give the word: "Quarter and rear-guards to the front!" and immediately afterwards, "Battalion! Order arms! Stand at ease!" On the first order the men for guard shoulder and move by companies thirty paces to the front; the rear-guard in rear of the quarter-guard, each guard standing in two ranks. The battalion adjutant then gives the word to the guards: "Inwards face!" "March!" and when they are opposite the centre of the battalion: "Halt!" "Front." When the guards are formed, the officer of the quarter-guard gives the word: "Rear-guard!" "Right about face!" and then to the two guards: "March!"

As soon as the guards are marched off, the sub-divisions open out to two-thirds distance to the rear, and the battalion commander orders "Pile arms!"

The pouch-belts and side-arms are then hung on the arms, and the battalion commander orders "Battalion, outwards face!" whereupon the companies take up the positions shown on the annexed plan, lay down their knapsacks, and then move back to their arms, where the orders are given out.

As soon as the arms are piled, the colours and drums are placed in front of their centre. The officers bivouac on the spots where they stood in column.

When several battalions bivouac near one another, the

interval between their camps should be twelve paces, and between regiments twenty-four paces.

In case of bivouacing in lines, which should only take place when it can be done without inconvenience to the troops, the distance between them will be regulated according to the ground.

On a plain, the distance from the cooking places of the first line to the pile of arms of the second should be 150 paces.

Each regiment will detail one field officer, one captain, and one subaltern for the duty of the day.

Duties in Bivouac.

1. *Strength of the quarter and rear-guard.*

The strength of each battalion quarter-guard is—

1 officer,
2 sergeants,
1 drummer or bugler, and
24 privates.

They furnish—

1 double sentry on the right flank,
1 „ „ left „

each in a line with the quarter-guard;

1 sentry over the arms,
1 „ colours,
1 „ commanding officer.

There are, besides—

2 corporals and
1 orderly man.

The strength of the battalion rear-guard is—

1 sergeant,
1 drummer or bugler,
21 privates.

They furnish—

1 double sentry on the right flank,
1 „ „ left „

each in a line with the guard;

1 sentry over the arms,
1 „ battalion wagons.

There are besides, two corporals for posting and visiting the sentries, and one orderly man.

The number of quarter and rear-guards and their composition are regulated according to the position of the bivouac, the number of battalions and of lines.

2. *Posting and giving orders to the sentries*

So soon as the officer of the quarter-guard arrives at his post, he halts and tells off his guard. The first relief then advances, and the sergeant posts the sentries according to the instructions received from the officer. The guard remain under arms until all the sentries have been posted; the men then pile arms and take off their knapsacks. The sentries take their knapsacks with them, and lay them down behind them. The officer then reports to the field officer of the day that his guardis mounted and sentries posted.

The following are the orders given to the sentries:—

They are to pay the usual compliments to officers between *réveille* and retreat-beating; but after retreat they do so only to patrols and visiting rounds. These are challenged as is customary when in garrison, except that only one man is sent forward to give the countersign.

Officers may all pass the chain of sentries by day; at night they and every one else who approaches it will be challenged with the "Halt, who goes there?" and directed to the guard; the officer on duty and the commanding officer excepted.

Any soldier wishing to go outside the bivouac will be referred to the quarter-guard; but those who desire to enter, as also all strangers, such as market people, &c., will be halted and conducted to the guard by a man of the double sentries.

The sentries will pay attention to what goes on at the outposts, and immediately announce to the guard any unusual movement.

The guard fall in during the relief and remain under arms until the return of the sentries. The sentries of the rear-guard are posted in the same manner, and receive the same instructions. The sentries are all posted with their backs to the bivouac. The sentry over the baggage wagons must keep a strict watch, and not allow any unauthorised person to approach them.

3. *Duty of the quarter and rear-guards.*

The guards pay the same compliments during the day as they do in garrison.

The officer takes care that the sentries perform their duties strictly. He sends to the field-officer of the day all arrested and suspected persons, and reports to him anything of importance. He gives careful attention to all that goes on at the outposts.

The parole, the sign, and the countersign, are sent to him by the battalion-adjutant, and he communicates the two latter to the sentries shortly before retreat-sounding.

During retreat-sounding (in which the drummers of the guard do not take part) the guards fall in under arms, and when it is over, the men say their prayers. The officer afterwards makes his report. After retreat, and until *réveille* the guards pay no compliments except to visiting rounds, and to the field-officer of the day. These rounds

are halted by the sentry over the arms, examined by a serjeant and two men, and then allowed to move up to the guard, where they give the parole.

Patrols are halted by the sentry over the arms, examined by a serjeant and two men, without getting the guard under arms.

To ensure the vigilance of the sentries, patrols of a corporal and one or two men are sent out during the night, at intervals between reliefs (at the discretion of the officer), along the chain of sentries up to the neighbouring guards; patrols are also sent out in particular cases—such as repeated gun-shots at the out-posts, unusual stir in the direction of the enemy—and the officer reports the information received to the field-officer of the day.

The officer carefully examines all persons handed over to the guard by the sentries. Any suspicious-looking persons are sent to the rear-guard, and the field-officer of the day is informed accordingly.

Whenever the sentries report the arrival of troops from outside, the guard stand to their arms, and a serjeant and two men are sent out to examine them.

When it has been ascertained who they are, their commander, or the whole party (if below ten in number), are to be conducted to the guard, where the officer himself examines them; and if they belong to the bivouac, he will allow them to pass. If they do not belong to the bivouac, they must proceed outside the line of sentries to their own camp.

Only one half of the guard are to be asleep during the night at the same time.

At an hour towards day-break, ordered by the commander-in-chief, the *réveille* is sounded from the guard, and prayers are then said.

In case of alarm, which can only be caused by a party of the enemy creeping in through the outposts towards the bivouac, the officer of the guard will march against him, that his resistance may give the requisite time for those in bivouac to get under arms.

The duty of the rear-guard is the same as that of the quarter-guard. Their particular business is the custody of those who are arrested, and to report on them to the field-officer of the day.

Two serjeants mount with each rear-guard to be at the disposal of the field-officer of the day, for such duties as will be named hereafter.

4. *Retreat and Réveille-sounding.*

Retreat-sounding will be at such an hour in the evening as may be determined by the commander-in-chief. The "Appel" (roll-call) will then be held by companies, the evening prayer said, the arms inspected, and the reserves for the piquets will leave the bivouac. At day-break the drums of the guard will beat the *réveille*, and the men rise and brush their clothes. An hour later there will be company's "Appel", and morning prayers.

The piquet reserves return to bivouac on receiving the order to do so.

5. *Duty of the field-officer of the day and of the officers for "visiting rounds."*

The field officer of the day comes on duty when the guards mount, and reports himself to the colonel of the regiment. He has charge of the guard and of the police of the whole bivouac of the regiment. He has the regimental captain and subaltern of the day detailed for visiting rounds to assist him. They mount at the same

time he does, report themselves to him, and receive his detailed instructions for the performance of their duties. The field-officer inspects the guards by day and by night, and causes the subordinate officers to do the same.

He receives the guard, reports and brings anything of importance to the notice of the colonel of the regiment.

In case of alarm, he repairs to the line of quarter-guards, and endeavours to check the advancing enemy until the troops in bivouac are under arms or are approaching.

For the performance of the police duties he employs the two sergeants told off by each battalion and attached to the rear-guards. They are to take care that no fire breaks out and to see that there is no cooking except at the appointed kitchens. They must not permit any soldiers to loiter about the sutlers' camp after retreat-sounding, nor to create noise or disorder.

6. *Assembly of the troops in front of the bivouac.*

This parade takes place only by special order; the troops then turn out with their clothing in order, in forage caps and without arms. The officers stand in one rank in front of the centre of battalions, and the drummers behind them.

7. *Proceeding in case of alarm.*

On occasions of alarm by day or by night, each soldier will immediately seize his arms and accoutrements and hasten to the *place d'armes.* The guards remain standing until specially ordered to move. The horses are at once put to the wagons.

8. *Break-up of the bivouac.*

When the bivouac is to be broken up the "general

march" is to be sounded one hour beforehand. The men then put on their knapsacks and prepare to march off.

The "*assembly*" will sound a quarter of an hour before the time fixed for departure. The men then take their arms and fall in on the quarter-guard parade, and the quarter and rear guards come in. After the "general march" has sounded, the fires are to be carefully put out by means of water or earth.

B.—*Cavalry. Entry into Bivouac.*

Cavalry always bivouac in column. The regiment is formed in column of squadrons at half distance on the ..t of the place of bivouac. On the order being given, "Standard and rear-guards to the front! march!" the men for guard form on the right of their respective squadrons, and then move at a gallop twenty paces in front of the centre of the first squadron, the standard guard forming the first rank, the rear-guard the second.

The officer of the standard-guard and the standard-bearer accompany them; the first places himself in front of the guard, the latter on the right of it. The trumpeters are marched up to guard mounting by the adjutant of the regiment and placed ten paces in front of the guards, facing the regiment.

"Regiment, return swords." The guards retain their words in hand.

"Regiment, divisions left wheel." "March." "Forward!" The divisions move to the distance of a squadron and one quarter. The guards following the movement by the "left" and "right turn."

When the last division has moved squadron distance to the left: "Regiment," "divisions right wheel!" "Forward!" "Halt!"

CAVALRY BIVOUAC.



The guards and trumpeters at the same time front, "Rear rank;" "About;" "March!" "Forward!"

Trumpets sound the "Take post." The officers of the first and fourth divisions pass round by the flanks, and place themselves in front of the rear rank.

The rear guard move to their place by the right of the regiment; swords are returned to the scabbards; a sentry is placed over the arms, and the remainder of the men join their squadrons.

When within 10 paces of the front rank of the following squadron, "Rear ranks!" "Halt!" The ranks divide the intervals and prepare to dismount without orders, and without moving out the first men for duty.

"Dismount!"

The men take off their helmets, pouch-belt and swords (cuirassiers the cuirass). The swords are thrust into the ground three paces in front of the heads of the horses, hilts to the front; the helmet is placed on the sword, peak to the front and gloves inside, the pouch-belt hung over all, with the flap outwards. The cuirass is placed below the sword, breast to the front. The lance is stuck into the ground half a pace to the right of the sword.

The piquet posts are driven in as much in line with one another as possible and at equal distances; the piquet ropes are then made fast.

The bits of the bridles are laid out near the arms, with the headstalls towards the horses.

On the order to unsaddle, saddles are placed three paces behind the horses, with the forks towards them; carbines remain on the saddles. The blankets are folded and placed on the saddles. The interval between regiments is 75 paces.

Duty in bivouac.

1. *Strength and duty of guards.*

The standard guard is composed of—

1 officer;
1 sergeant;
1 trumpeter; and
11 privates.

These furnish; 1 sentry in front of each flank; 1 sentry over the standard; 1 man to post and visit the sentries; 1 orderly man.

The rear guard is composed of—

1 sergeant, and
11 privates.

These furnish 1 sentry on the right, facing outwards; 1 sentry on the left, facing outwards; 1 sentry over the arms; 1 man to post and visit the sentries; 1 orderly man.

The strength of the guards, especially of light cavalry, depends on the number of men detached. It is left to the discretion of the commander to reduce them to the number actually necessary for the security of the bivouac.

After the standard guard is posted, swords are returned; the officer then orders the first man for sentry over the arms, the sergeant and the trumpeter to dismount; and the standard to be fixed in the ground, with the kettle drums two paces in front of it. He then moves off the guard to the left, at a walk, and the men, including the trumpeter, rejoin their squadrons. The sergeant of the rear guard acts in a similar manner. A quarter of an hour after this the guards are to be assembled at their posts and the sentries posted forthwith.

Whenever the guard stand to their arms the sentry

places himself to the right, and close to the standard. The officer falls in on the right of the guard, with the trumpeter one pace on his right. As soon as it becomes dark the sentries on the flanks of the regiment challenge all who approach them with, "Halt! who goes there," and order those who do not belong to the regiment to the standard guard.

Compliments will be paid as in garrison, and prayers said after retreat. The rear guard will take care that no man loiters at the sutlers' camp after retreat. During the night, patrols of a corporal and one or two privates are sent out by the guards, at intervals, along the chain up to the neighbouring guards; their particular object being to ensure the vigilance of the sentries. Anything of importance is to be reported to the captain of the day.

2. *Duty of the captain of the day.*

A regiment has a captain and each squadron an officer and two sergeants of the day.

The captain reports himself to the commander and receives his orders as to the hours of unsaddling, feeding, watering, &c. He reports to him also on everything connected with the duties in bivouac.

As soon as it begins to get dark he orders the streets between squadrons to be closed.

3. "*Retreat*" *and* "*Boot and Saddle*" *sounding.*

Retreat will be sounded in the evening, before dark, at the hour named by the commanding officer. The trumpeters assemble at the standard half-an-hour before and play as is usual, in the evening. The squadrons at the same time fall in for Appel (roll call). After the retreat the trumpeters play a hymn, and the men say their prayers in a low voice.

The "Boot and Saddle" will generally be sounded by the trumpeter of the guard at day-break. When the bivouac is to break up early it will sound three hours before moving off. The men then rise at once and commence their stable duties.

4. *Assembly of the troops in front of the bivouac.*

The squadrons fall in in front of the bivouac only by particular order, and then in fatigue dress with forage caps and without side-arms,—the officers in front of the right of their squadrons. The trumpeters form a circle in front of the standard and play.

5. *Proceding in case of an alarm.*

Each man saddles his horse as quickly as possible, dresses himself, takes his arms and accoutrements, and rides to the alarm post.

6. *Breaking up of the bivouac.*

The guards and sentries will be brought in half-an-hour before moving off. The standard-bearer repairs, mounted, to the standard, puts it into the bucket, and faces outwards. The junior officer of the regiment, who ought to come up at the same moment, halts in front of the standard. The officer of the guard and the sentry over the standard retire as soon as the standard-bearer has taken charge of it.

When the regiment is about to leave the bivouac, the order will be given "to horse," followed by the "mount." The officers remain in the places they were in, on going into bivouac, in front of the ranks.

The squadrons close towards the right of the front ranks.

ARTILLERY BIVOUAC.



"Front ranks! about! march! forward!"

When close to the rear ranks,—

"Regiment—front! halt!"

The officers of the first and fourth divisions move to their proper places.

"Regiment—divisions right wheel! march! forwards!"

And when arrived on the ground where it stood before going into bivouac,—

"Regiment—divisions left wheel! march! halt!"

"Regiment—draw swords! attention!"

The officer who has accompanied the regiment with the standard, takes it to its proper place.

C.—*Artillery. Entry into Bivouac.*

The guns and carriages are formed on the ground intended for the bivouac, as shown in the plan. The wagons having the heads of the leading horses four paces from the muzzles of the guns in front. In the horse artillery the detachments are formed in the intervals to the right, in line with their respective markers, and one pace from them.

"Park and rear-guards to the front, march."

The men for duty fall in (horse artillery mounted) ten paces in front of the centre of the battery; the park-guard in the front rank and the rear-guard in rear.

Afterwards, on the order to "dismount" and "unhook," the division commanders mark the front angles of each of the horse lines by driving picket posts into the ground.

The drivers having in the meanwhile with the assistance of the detachments unhooked the horses advance one horse's length and re-mount. In the horse artillery the rear rank of the detachments rein back one yard.

On the order "About! march! halt!" each rank, and

the men for guard in the horse artillery, wheel to the right about. In the field batteries they face about. The pairs of horses of all the teams which are on the right of the entrance to the lines turn to the left about, the others to the right about, and halt.

"*March!*"

Guards and gunners of field batteries march to their posts.

The teams and mounted detachments advance "by twos" from the centre, between half batteries and move in the following order into the horse lines: commanders of divisions, teams of the third line, wheelers leading, teams of wagons and guns of the second and first lines.

The detachments of horse artillery place themselves, rear rank leading in front of the teams of their respective guns.

So soon as the heads of the columns reach the rear of the lines, the command is given "right and left wheel, march! forward! halt!"

The non-commissioned officers and all drivers wheel towards the lines nearest them. The horse artillery detachments wheel by ranks, and open the intervals sufficiently to give the horses room.

The order is now given: "Dismount!" "Unharness!"

The men then take off their helmets valises and arms. The picket posts are driven in and the picket ropes made fast. The swords of the mounted men are thrust into the ground six paces in rear of the saddle horses, with the edges from the horses. The helmets are placed on the swords with the eagle plates facing the same way as the edges of the swords. The pouches of the horse artillerymen are placed over the helmet. The harness is placed

three paces in rear of the horses in the following order:—The saddles and pads* of the off horses with the pummels towards the horses, the blankets upon them ready folded for saddling, the bridle with the bit towards the horse. The collar harness of the drought horses is placed so as to rest on the fore-part or pad end of the saddle with the lower part towards the saddle. Breast harness is placed in the same manner.

Detachments of field artillery place their appointments in two lines. The knapsacks with the straps turned back over them and the canteen removed; the helmets on the knapsacks, eagle-plates in front.

Duty in Bivouac.

1. *Strength and duty of the Guards.*

The park and rear-guards of a battery of eight guns are of the strength of a bombardier and six men each. They furnish two sentries each, and each sentry has charge either of the park or of the camp of half a battery.

The guards of a battery of four guns are generally only half as strong, and furnish only one sentry each. The two guards look to the safety of the guns and to the maintenance of order in the bivouac; they have also to see that no men leave it without permission. The park-guard must not allow any one to meddle with the guns, or to pass between the carriages without the presence of the subdivision commanders.

The particular duty of the rear-guard is to guard against fire, and in case of it breaking out, to give the alarm and help to put it out.

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* The Prussian off horses now each carry a saddle, the same as the saddle horses.

The sentries must keep a look-out on all that goes on outside their own bivouac, and report immediately any unusual movement in the other bivouacs, or any signal or firing at the outposts.

Every one must be challenged at night, and unknown and suspicious-looking persons sent to the park-guard, although they may have given the parole and countersign.

Anything of importance is to be immediately reported to the officer of the day.

2. *Duty of the Officer of the day.*

An officer of the day is to be detailed by each battery with a bombardier to assist him; he carries out the orders of the commander of the battery as regards unsaddling, feeding, watering, &c.; on him devolve also the arrangements, general order and requirements of the bivouac, and the superintendence of the duties. He will report anything of importance to his commanding officer.

3. "*Retreat*" *and* "*Boot and Saddle*" *sounding.*

"Retreat" will sound at night-fall. Before "retreat" the men fall in, in front of the guns for the "Appel," and the orders are given out. They then say their prayers in a low voice and go to rest. "Boot and saddle" will sound at day-break, or two hours and a-half to three hours before the march. The men then rise, the detachments clean their appointments, and the remainder go to stables.

4. *Assembly in front of the Bivouac.*

The parade in front of the bivouac only takes place by special order, and then in fatigue dress, forage cap, and without side-arms. The men form on the "Appel" parade, the officers in front of the right.

5. *Proceeding in case of alarm.*

In the event of alarm the horses are moved out of the horse lines by teams at a trot; each team moving to its respective carriage by the shortest way. The detachments, after having assisted in saddling and harnessing, hasten to their guns to help to hook in. They then put on their accoutrements and stand to their guns.

6. *Breaking up from the Bivouac.*

On the "saddle" sounding all is to be made ready for marching off. The drivers and detachments mount without word of command, as soon as they have got their horses ready; they will then receive the order "Rein back!" "March!" (one horse's length) and on the order, "Right and left wheel! march! forward!" they move at a walk to their respective guns and carriages in reverse order to that in which they entered the horse lines; they then dismount on the order and hook in. The detachments of the field batteries put on their knapsacks and go straight to their respective guns. The drivers mount as soon as they have hooked in.

D.—*Jägers (Riflemen) and Marksmen.*

The Jägers and marksmen bivouac according to the instructions given in section A.

E.—*Pioneers.*

The pioneers bivouac according to the instructions given in section A (*see* page 63).

APPENDIX.

PROGRAMME.

A.—*Preparations.*

1. So soon as His Majesty's decision respecting the manœuvres of the troops for the current year is published, the commanding generals will submit to the War Minister their proposed arrangements in detail, including their selection of ground and the dates on which the exercises are to take place.

2. In the years that the autumn manœuvres of *corps d'armée* take place before the king, they will forward to the Minister of War, for the gracious approval of His Majesty, the general and special ideas for their united manœuvres, together with a plan of the order of battle and of the formation for parade, according to the forms given in Supplements I. and II.

The order of battle, which is the normal and original fighting formation of the *corps d'armée* (*see* Supplement IV.) (not to be confounded with the varying tactical formations), shows the composition of the brigades, divisions, &c., of the corps, conformable to the directions given in the instructions for the mobilisation of the army (chap I., sec. I.), it defines all that is necessary as to the distribution of command, concerning which the following principles are to be observed.

Vacancies in the command of divisions are to be filled by the senior brigade commanders; vacant brigades by the senior commanders of regiments in their respective

corps, according to the arm to which they belong; vacant line regiments by their own senior battalion commanders.

"Landwehr" regiments of infantry are to be commanded by the senior infantry field officers in the corps, and may be either posted, attached or appointed only to do duty.

In the cavalry the vacant command of a regiment is given, as a rule, to the senior field officer; when however, he happens to be in command of the corresponding "Landwehr" cavalry regiment, the line regiment will be commanded by the senior captain of the regiment, unless it be decided otherwise by the proper authorities.

These principles will be acted upon throughout, unless particular circumstances (which should be stated) render it necessary to deviate from them.

3. The commander-in-chief and generals of divisions will inform the chief of the staff of the army what maps are necessary for the purposes of the manœuvre, and such requirements will be supplied as far as possible from the stock in the map depôt.

When it is necessary to prepare special maps for carrying out the great autumn manœuvres before His Majesty, the chief of the staff of the army has instructions to charge the cost to the Minister of War, and to cause the maps required to be supplied at once.

4. Demands for field metallographic presses for copying orders, dispositions, &c., are to be made by the commander-in-chief on the Minister of War.

5. When several *corps d'armée* manœuvre together, the general idea on which the exercise is to be carried out, and special ideas relative thereto, are to be communicated the day before each manœuvre.

B.—*Course of the Exercises.*

6. The proposed dispositions of the commanding generals acting against one another must be forwarded to the commander-in-chief, when practicable, the day before each manœuvre, together with a sufficient number of copies for the umpires.

7. Whenever the king attends the autumn manœuvres of a *corps d'armee*, the commanding general will present His Majesty, on arrival, with a "state" of the corps for the day preceding a manœuvre, with a "programme" of the proposed dispositions, and on the day before the review-order parade, with a plan showing the formation of the troops to be present. (Supplement III.)

The day before the parade a "marching-state" will be sent to the adjutant-general and to the aide-de-camp to His Majesty, giving the names of commanding officers, including those leading the several divisions (companies or half companies, squadrons or half squadrons), in the order in which they march past.

The report on each disposition will be headed with the special idea to which it refers, and contain the proposed tactical distribution of the troops concerned, according to the form given in Supplement IV.

When the same distribution is to be maintained in the manœuvres that follow, or when trifling alterations only are made, it will be only necessary to mention it in the report.

The instructions given in Supplement II. regarding the size and thickness of the paper apply to this report also. Taking into account, however, the smaller dimensions of the paper, the writing may extend over the whole sheet.

If the general officer commanding the corps has a

metallographic press at his disposal, he will cause a sufficient number of copies of the dispositions and accompaniments (Supplement IV.) and of "states" of the troops on parade to be struck off. At the commencement of the parade or manœuvre an officer will distribute a copy to each of the spectators in His Majesty's suite.

8. General officers commanding will, in the year when no great autumn manœuvres of their corps take place, forward to the Minister of War by the 15th September a short and concise report (according to Supplement V.) on the manner in which the autumn manœuvres have been conducted, and on the efficiency, &c., of the officers and troops.

Special reports on particular manœuvres, performed in the presence of commanding generals, are to be added at the discretion of the commander-in-chief.

They will contain—

1. The idea that originated the manœuvre.
2. The dispositions of the commanders on both sides.
3. A short and concise description of such dispositions.
4. The necessary sketch for the comprehension of the manœuvre.

The general commanding the corps must express his opinion as to the dispositions made by the commanding generals, and as to their manner of executing them, and his remarks are, as far as possible, to be given opposite those parts of the report to which they refer.

9. In the years of the great autumn manœuvres before His Majesty, the generals in command will send to the chief of the staff of the army, as soon as possible, the report prescribed in section 8 and Supplement V., together with the special reports of the commanders of the opposed

forces, which latter should include the special reports of commanders of detachments (advanced guards, reserves, &c.)

(Form.) SUPPLEMENT I.

ORDER OF BATTLE

OF THE ^{d}CORPS D'ARMEE DURING THE GREAT AUTUMN MANŒUVRES IN THE YEAR 18

General Commanding . .	Lieut.-General
Chief of the Staff . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
Commander of Artillery . .	„
Infantry Division . . .	Lieut.-General
Infantry Brigade . . .	Major-General
Regiment of Guards (attached) .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Infantry Regiment . . .	Major-General
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Infantry Division . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„

Fusilier Battalion . .	Major
Jäger Battalion . . .	Captain
Dragoon Regiment . . .	Major
Battery of the ^{d} Brigade of Artillery	„
Infantry Division . . .	Lieut.-General
Infantry Brigade . . .	Colonel
Infantry Regiment . . .	„
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	Captain
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . . .	„
Infantry Brigade . . .	Major-General
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	„
2*nd Battalion* . . .	Major
Fusilier Battalion . .	Captain
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Battery of the ^{d} Brigade of Artillery	„
Cavalry Division . . .	Major-General
Light Cavalry Brigade . .	Colonel
Dragoon Regiment . . .	Captain
Hussar „ . . .	„
Heavy Cavalry Brigade . .	Major-General
Cuirassier Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
Ulan Regiment	„

Horse Battery of the [d] Brigade of Artillery	Major
Artillery Reserve [d] Brigade of Artillery	„
Field Battery	„
Horse Artillery Battery	„

OBSERVATION.

When the Regiment of Fusiliers takes part in a manœuvre it will be attached to one of the divisions.

(Form.) SUPPLEMENT II.

PARADE STATE

OF THE TROOPS AND THEIR COMMANDERS OF THE CORPS D'ARMEE ON THE 18

General Commanding	Lieut.-General
Chief of the Staff	Lieut.-Colonel
1st Line.	
Infantry Division	Lieut.-General
Infantry Brigade	Major-General
Guards Regiment (attached)	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion*	Major
2*nd Battalion*	„
Fusilier Battalion	„
Infantry Regiment	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion*	Major
2*nd Battalion*	„
Fusilier Battalion	„
Infantry Regiment	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion*	Major
2*nd Battalion*	„
Fusilier Battalion	„

Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Infantry Brigade . . .	Major-General
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Infantry Division . . .	Lieut.-General
Infantry Brigade . . .	Colonel
Infantry Regiment . . .	„
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	Captain
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Infantry Brigade . . .	Major-General
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	„
2*nd Battalion* . . .	Major
Fusilier Battalion . .	Captain
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Fusilier Regiment . . .	Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
3*rd Battalion* . . .	„
Jäger Battalion (*attached*) . .	Captain

Pioneer Battalion (attached)	Captain

2nd Line.

Cavalry Division . . .	Major-General
Light Cavalry Brigade . .	Colonel
Dragoon Regiment . . .	Captain
„ „ . . .	Major
Hussar Regiment . . .	„
Heavy Cavalry Brigade . .	Major-General
Curassier Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
Regiment of	Major
„ „ . . .	„
Artillery Brigade . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Field Battery* . .	Major
2*nd Field Battery* . .	„
3*rd Field Battery* . .	„
Horse Artillery Battery . .	„
Train	„

Explanations.

1. Commanding officers, including general officers, commanders of battalions and of batteries, will be styled according to their name and appointment; but when they are only temporarily in command their actual rank will be given.

2. When the "Landwehr" takes part at the parade the head-quarters of the battalions and the unembodied squadrons will be given.

3. The size of the paper to be employed is the quarto or large octavo, and the programmes must be written or metallographed on strong cardboard that they may be used on horseback.

The above form will be a guide for writing and abbreviations. Proper names, and those of bodies of troops from brigades upwards, to be given in Roman characters.

(Form.) SUPPLEMENT IV.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE TROOPS

OF THE ^{d} CORPS D'ARMÉE AT THE MANŒUVRE AGAINST THE ^{d} CORPS D'ARMÉE, THE OF 18

General Commanding . .	Lieut.-General
Chief of the Staff . .	Lieut.-Colonel
Commander of Artillery . .	„
Advanced Guard . . .	Major-General
Infantry Brigade . . .	„
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	Captain
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Infantry Regiment . . .	Major
1*st Battalion* . . .	„
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Jäger Battalion . . .	„
Battery Rifled-Artillery Brigade	Captain
Howitzer Battery „ .	„
Pontoon Train of Advanced Guard	„
Cavalry :—	
Hussar Regiment . .	Major
Half-Horse Battery . .	Captain
Main Body . . .	Lieut.-General

Infantry Division . . .	Major-General
Fusilier Battalion . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
3*rd Battalion* . . .	Captain
Infantry Brigade . . .	Colonel
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	Captain
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	Captain
Infantry Brigade . . .	Major-General
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	Captain
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	„
Rifled Battery	Captain
Howitzer Battery . . .	„
12-*pounder Battery* . . .	„
Dragoon Regiment . . .	Major
Reserve	Lieut.-General
Infantry Brigade . . .	Colonel
Infantry Regiment . . .	„
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	„
Fusilier Battalion . .	Captain

Infantry Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
1*st Battalion* . . .	Major
2*nd Battalion* . . .	Captain
Fusilier Battalion . .	Major
12-*pounder Battery* . . .	Captain
Cavalry Reserve . . .	Major-General
Cavalry Brigade . . .	Colonel
Dragoon Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
Ulan Regiment	Major
Cavalry Brigade . . .	Colonel
Curassier Regiment . . .	Lieut.-Colonel
Ulan Regiment	Major
Horse Battery	Captain
Artillery Reserve . . .	Major
Rifled Field Battery . . .	Captain
Howitzer „	„
12-*pounder* „	„
Horse „	„
Half-Horse „	„
Pioneer „	„
Pontoon Train	„

NOTE.

1. The directions given in the explanations to Supplement II. are to be conformed to here, with this exception, that the name of the head-quarters of the "Landwehr" Battalion, and not that of the embodied squadrons, is to be omitted.

2. The original and normal formation is to be departed from as little as possible in the tactical subdivision of the troops.

Supplement V.

Report of the Autumn Manœuvres

of the Divisions of the [d] Corps d'Armee in the year 18 .

The Division.

If the manœuvres have taken place exactly according to the appointed dates.

1. Distribution of the exercises as regards time.

   Whether any deviations have taken place, and if so, what they are; also under what circumstances these deviations have been brought about?

2. Strength of the troops taking part in the manœuvres.

   The strength is only to be given at the conclusion of the exercises, and made out on a "State." Important deviations from the established strength are to be explained.

3. Condition of the troops.

4. Disposition and direction of the manœuvres.

5. Provisions and supplies.

6. Health.

   Here give the sick list from the commencement of the regimental exercises until the conclusion of the manœuvres.

7. Particular observations.

(Form.)

Parade Formation of the 1st. Corps d'Armée.

Supplement III.

On the ..... 18....

General of Infantry N.N.

1st. Line.

Lieutenant General.

4. *Infantry Brigade.*
Major General.

2. P.r Prus.n B. N.o 1.	2. P.r Reg.t B. N.o 1.	8. E.P.r Inf.y Reg.t N.o 45. *Colonel.*			4. E.P.r Gren.r Reg.t N.o 5. *Colonel.*			7. E.P.r Inf.y *Colonel.*	
Major	*Major*	I. *Maj.t*	II. *Maj.t*	I. *Maj.t*	I. *Maj.t*	II. *Maj.t*	I. *Maj.t*	V. *Maj.t*	I. *Maj.t*

3. *Infantry Brigade.*
Major General.

Reg.t N.o 44.	1. P.r Fus.r Reg.t N.o 33. *Colonel.*			3. E.P.r Gren.r Reg.t N.o 4. *Colonel.*		
I. *Maj.t*	III. *Maj.t*	II. *Maj.t*	I. *Maj.t*	V. *Maj.t*	II. *Maj.t*	I. *Maj.t*

2. *Infantry Brigade.*
Major General.

6. E.P.r Inf.y Reg.t N.o 43. *Colonel*			2. E.P.r Gren.r Reg.t N.o 3. *Colonel*		
V. *Maj.t*	II. *Maj.t*	I. *Maj.t*	V. *Maj.t*	II. *Maj.t*	I. *Maj.t*

1. *Infantry Brigade.*
Major General.

5. E.P.r Inf.y Reg.t N.o 41. *Colonel.*			1. E.P.r Gren.r Reg.t N.o 1. *Colonel.*		
V. *Maj.t*	II. *Maj.t*	I. *Maj.t*	V. *Maj.t*	II. *Maj.t*	I. *Maj.t*

2nd. Line.

Lieutenant General.

Train Battalion of the 1st. Corps d'Armée. — *Major*

E. Prus.n Artillery Brigade. N.o 1. — *Colonel.*

Horse Art.y Batt.r — *Major*	3. F.d Battery *Major*	2. F.d Battery *Major*	1. F.d Battery *Major*

2. *Cavalry Brigade*
Major General.

5. 1st W.st Reg.t *Colonel.*	3. F.st Reg.t N.o 8. *Colonel.*	1. 1st W.st Hus.r Reg.t *Colonel.*

1. *Cavalry Brigade*
Major General.

1. Leib Hus.r Reg.t N.o 1. *Colonel.*	Luft. II Reg.t N.o 2. *Colonel.*	Luft. I Reg.t N.o 1. *Colonel.*	E.P.r Hus.r Reg.t N.o 3. *Colonel.*

Explanations.

1. If the Pion. Batt.n not composed of as many as he shown on the Scale.
2. The Landwehr Regt.s or Battln.s that have not been called out will be left out, and the ranks left to coalesce.
3. Cavalry and Artillery Corps (Divisional Corps) to be grouped to suit the Ground.
4. The Artillery and Train Battalion to be placed on the right of the Infantry and Cavalry, and the Cavalry on the left of the Infantry; but, for facilitating the Parade Movements, the Artillery and Train Battalion may be placed on the left of the Cavalry.
5. The Major of the Train and of the Brigade named Colonel, the other Majors.

1. The names of the Commanders of Regts & Batts are to be given.
2. The Cav.y Brigades named according to their Brigade Numbers, the Inf.y in the same manner according to seniority of Generals. That in the rear to be named first, i.e. if the right Brigade is placed in the right of second order and succeeding lines.
3. The name and the Commander in the event of the Gen.l following in the same order, the junior will take command of the Div.n in the absence of a senior or Brigade out of the same Corps.

(Place.) (Date.)

(Signed.)

(Rank.)

(Form.)

Order of Battle of the 1st Corps d'Armée.

Supplement VI.

General Commanding.
Chief of the Staff.
Commander of Artillery
Commanding Engineer.

General Staff.

Aides de Camp.

Aides de Camp of Brd Com.r

Engineer Officers
A.D.C. to the 1st Engineer Officer

Commander of H.d Q.rs Guard.

2. Infantry Division.

General Commanding.
Staff Officer
A.D.C. 1
2

4. Infantry Brigade.

Major General Com.d
A.D.C.

4. R.t Gren.r Regiment (N.o 5.)
Colonel.
Batt.n Batt.n 2.nd Batt.n 1.st Batt.n

8. R.t Infantry Regiment (N.o 65.)
Colonel.
Batt.n Batt.n 2.nd Batt.n 1.st Batt.n

3. Infantry Brigade.

Major General Com.d
A.D.C.

3. R.t Fus.r Regiment (N.o 33.)
Colonel.
3.rd Batt.n 2.nd Batt.n 1.st Batt.n

3. R.t Gren.r Regiment (N.o 4.)
Colonel.
3.rd Batt.n 2.nd Batt.n 1.st Batt.n

7. R.t Infantry Regiment (N.o 44.)
Colonel.
2.nd Batt.n 3.rd Batt.n Batt.n

1. Lith (Hussar Reg.t N.o 1.)
Lieut. Colonel.

2. Field Batteries.
Major.
2. Horse Batt.n Field Batt.n 2. 12.r Batt.n

Pontoon Battalion. (N.o 1.)
Major.

Field Telegraph.
Captain.

1. Infantry Division.

General Commanding.
Staff Officer
A.D.C. 1
2

2. Infantry Brigade.

Major General Com.d
A.D.C.

2. R.t Gren.r Regiment (N.o 3.)
Colonel.
Batt.n Batt.n 2.nd Batt.n 1.st Batt.n

6. R.t Infantry Regiment (N.o 43.)
Colonel.
Batt.n Batt.n 3.rd Batt.n 2.nd Batt.n 1.st Batt.n

R.t Light Battalion. (N.o 1.)
Major.

Light Drag.s Regiment (N.o 1.)
Lieut. Colonel.

1. Field Batteries.
Major.
1. Horse Batt.n 1. Batt.n 2. 12.r Batt.n

1. Infantry Brigade.

Major General Com.d
A.D.C.

1. R.t Gren.r Regiment (N.o 1.)
Colonel.
2.nd Batt.n 1.st Batt.n Batt.n

5. R.t Infantry Regiment (N.o 41.)
Colonel.
2.nd Batt.n 1.st Batt.n Batt.n

1. Cavalry Division.

Lieut. General Commanding
Staff Officer
A.D.C. 1
2.

2. Cavalry Brigade.

Major General Com.d
A.D.C.

6. Landwehr Huss.rs Reg.t
Major.

1. Landwehr Uhlans Reg.t

1. R.t Huss.r Reg.t (N.o 8.)
Major.
2. Horse Batt.n
Captain.

1. Cavalry Brigade.

Major General Com.d
A.D.C.

Lith. Huss.r Reg.t (N.o 12.)
Major.

2. R.t Uhlan Reg.t (N.o 3.)

Horse Artillery.

Commander
3. Batteries.
Major.
1. Horse Batt.n 1. 12.r Batt.n 2. 12.r Batt.n

Horse Batteries.
Captain.
1. Batt.n 2. Horse Batt.n

Distribution of the Columns of Supply.
Major.

Ammunition Columns.
N.o 8. N.o 7. N.o 6. N.o 5. N.o 4. N.o 3. N.o 2. N.o 1.

Pontoon Column.
Captain.

Train Battalion.
Major.

Provision Columns.
Hospital. Horse Depot. Field Bakers Co.y N.o 5. N.o 4. N.o 3. N.o 2. N.o 1.

Field Hospital.

Light Field Rocket.
N.o 3. N.o 2. N.o 1.

General Field Hospital.

(Place.)

(Date.)

(signed)

(Rank.)

Explanations.
1. The brigade shown in the line are to be marked "regular".
2. When any Corps such as the Landwehr Uhlan Reg.t &c. and particular Corps such as the Field Telegraph and Supply Columns are not present they are not to be shown.

Explanations with reference to plan M.

1. The object of the manœuvres against an enemy represented by small detachments (skeleton enemy), is to practise the commanders in understanding and accomplishing a given task according to the different arms of the enemy opposed to them and the features of the ground. Such manœuvres should be so managed that the several divisions of troops manœuvring may all be employed as often as possible. With this view some of the divisions may be allowed a degree of latitude as regards strict conformity to the principles of tactics.

2. The chief in command commands himself. He divides the manœuvre into a number of movements, and arranges carefully beforehand the positions and movements of the skeleton enemy. The movements are to be separated by pauses when this can be done without prejudice to the intended representation of what would occur in war.

3. The skeleton enemy never manœuvres independently. He should only be the motive for the measures of the manœuvring troops.

4. Commanding officers and troops are made acquainted with the general idea and rendezvous only—all the rest is ordered as the manœuvre proceeds.

Example of the Manœuvre of a Division against a Skeleton Enemy.

(*Vide* Plan.)

General Idea.

A beaten army withdraws itself across the river Rabach. A rear-guard covers the retreat. A division of the hostile army falls in with the rear-guard near Neüdorf and attacks it.

(For the rendezvous of the division, *vide* Plan.)

Instructions for the Skeleton Enemy.

It represents the rear-guard of the beaten enemy, and will take up eight different positions in the following manner :—

(The several positions of the Skeleton Enemy are shown thus:—————)

1st Move. Deployment of the cavalry and of a battery near Neüdorf Mill.

2nd Move. Assembly of the whole of the rear-guard in position with Neüdorf in front.

3rd Move. Advance of the infantry against the right of the enemy's advanced guard and against the head of the column of march of his main body.

(This movement will be ordered by the commander of the division.)

4th Move. Deployment of the cavalry to cover the retreat on the plateau to the north of Neüdorf.

5th Move. Occupation of Neüstedt with infantry and two batteries.

6th Move. The infantry take up a position in the wood of Neüstedt and two batteries at Neüstedt Mills.

7th Move. Offensive movement against the enemy advaning in the wood of Neüstedt.

(This movement will be ordered by the commander of the division.)

8th Move. The whole of the rear-guard takes up a position near Neüstedt Mills.


M
N
W
E
S
VIII Move.
VI & VII Move.
Neustedt Hills
Neustedt Wood
V Move.
Neustedt
Neudorf
III Move.
II Move.
I Move.
NOTE.
The Troops manœuvring.
Skeleton Enemy.
Line separating the several movements into which the manœuvre is divided.
Rendezvous
Cavalry
Advanced Guard
Main body

RENDEZVOUS FORMATION.

of a Corps d'Armée on the War Establishment.

Advanced Guard.



1. Lt Cavalry Reg.o of the Xth div.n (Hus.rs)

½ Bat.n H.A. reserve

Jager Batt.n

1 Inf.y B.de X. Div.n

1 Rif. Bat.n 1 How. Bat.n X. Div.n

Advance Pont.n Train

Main Body.



Fus.r Reg.o

Div.n

(Drag.rs)

Reserve.

Cavalry.

1. Lt Drag.s 3 Heavy

(3. Ul.n 1. Cur.r Reg.o)

1. H. A. Batty

Infantry.

1. B.de of the Xth Div.n and 1. 12 Pr. Batty

Artillery.

Field Horse } *Artillery.*

9 Ammun.n Col.ns

Pioneers.

Pion.r Bat.n

Pontoon Train.

00106888

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